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I .  OVERVIEW OF THE INDUSTRY
A. INTRODUCTION
The regional a i r l i n e  industry has experienced substantial growth 
during the 15 years i t  has been recognized as representing a d is t in c t  
class of a i r  ca rr ie rs .  I t  was in 1969 that the C iv i l  Aeronautics Board 
recognized the need to establish a class of small, noncertif icated  
scheduled a i r l in e s .  Thus, the regional/commuter a i r l in e  industry was 
born. During 1984, regional a i r l in e s  transported 26.1 m il l ion  
passengers and i t s  revenue passenger miles totaled 4.17 b i l l io n .^  
Regional a i r l in e s  are read i ly  becoming a major force in the passenger 
transportation industry and the indications are that this upward trend 
w i l l  continue into the 1990's.
The typical regional a i r l i n e  operates scheduled, high-frequency 
f l ig h ts  from outlying communities to the larger airports where the ir  
passengers and cargo may continue on other scheduled f l ig h ts .  The 
a i r c r a f t  used for  these f l ig h ts  are generally piston or turboprop, 
multi-engine a i r c r a f t  which can be flown at lower a lt i tudes than the j e t  
a i r c r a f t  operated by the long-haul ca rr ie rs .  The average t r i p  length of 
the regional c a r r ie r  is usually between 100 to 300 miles.
The e f f ic ie nc ie s  of operating smaller a i r c r a f t  has allowed the 
regional a i r l in e s  to serve not only the smaller communities e f fe c t iv e ly  
but also larger c i t i e s  which have long, narrow markets, i . e .  many 
passengers evenly spread throughout the day. Because of these operating 
e f f ic ie n c ie s ,  regional a i r l in e s  are able to p r o f i t  in such markets 
whereas major carr iers  operating j e t  a i r c r a f t  cannot.
Simply stated, regional a i r l in e s  are those carr iers which provide 
regular ly  scheduled passenger and/or cargo service with a i r c r a f t  seating
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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fewer than 60 passengers and a cargo payload of 18,000 pounds or less. 
These a i r l in e s  operate according to schedules published in the widely 
used a i r l i n e  schedule guides. Regional a i r l in e s  are often referred to 
as commuter a i r l in e s  or simply commuters, and these terms w i l l  be used 
interchangeably throughout. In 1981, the Commuter A ir l in e  Association 
was renamed the Regional A i r l in e  Association.
B. HISTORY OF AIRLINE DEVELOPMENT
The modern system of a i r  transportation in the United States is not 
very old. The C iv i l  Aeronautics Act of 1938 created the Civi l  
Aeronautics Board (CAB) and established guidelines for the Board to 
regulate rates and routes of a i r l in e s  through a system of c e r t i f ic a t io n .  
Carriers granted c e r t i f ic a te s  at that time were termed "trunk carriers"  
and are today referred to as "major" ca rr ie rs .
O r ig in a l ly ,  there were two general classes of a i r  transportation  
common carr iers  - trunk carr iers  and non-scheduled carr ie rs .  The trunk 
carr iers  provided scheduled service on fixed routes whereas the non­
scheduled carr iers  furnished service on request without schedules. 
These small,  non-scheduled carr ie rs  p r in c ip a l ly  operated from a fixed  
base and hence the term, "fixed-base operator" (FBO) was coined. For 
these non-scheduled c a r r ie rs ,  transportation services were incidental to 
the principal business a c t iv i t ie s  of f l i g h t  instruction and the sale and 
service of a i r c r a f t .
In 1945, the CAB established a new category of c a rr ie r  known as 
"local service" c a r r ie rs .  This new class of c a r r ie r  was created by the 
Board to serve the a i r  transportation needs of small communities which 
the trunk a i r l in e s  believed they could not serve economically. Like the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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trunk c a r r ie r ,  the local c a r r ie r  provided scheduled service to these
smaller communities but they did so with smaller,  more economical
a i r c r a f t .  U t i l i z in g  th is  type of a i r c r a f t  allowed the local c a r r ie r  to
operate the route p ro f i ta b ly .
The Local Service Experiment
The local service carr iers  evolved from the requests made by many 
small communities demanding th e i r  own scheduled a i r  service. This led 
the CAB to i n i t i a t e  the so-called local service experiment. I t  allowed 
the smaller,  "local service" carr iers  to serve th e i r  own geographical 
areas instead of having the exist ing trunk carr iers  expand into these 
small communities. I t  was thought that th is  arrangement would better
serve the interests of the region.
The local service experiment has had a profound impact on the 
development of the regional a i r l in e  industry. As required by the Act of 
1938, these carr ie rs  were protected from economic competition and 
duplication of services. This was accomplished by imposing various 
gross ta k e -o f f  weight l im ita t ions on the a i r c r a f t  permitted for use by 
non-cert i f icated  ca rr ie rs .  Hence, the domestic commercial a i r  
transportation became a three- leve l  structure -  trunks, locals and the 
a i r  tax is .
The original 1938 leg is la t io n  also did not provide for fixed based 
a i r l i n e  operators who engaged in transportation as common ca rr ie rs .  In 
1947, the Board established two classes of non-scheduled a i r  carr iers  — 
labeled "large" and "small" c a r r ie rs .  A i r l in e s  which operated single 
engine a i r c r a f t  with a gross takeoff  weight of 10,000 pounds or less 
comprised the "small,  non-scheduled carr ie rs"  and were termed "a ir
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ta x is " .  These " a i r  taxis" were the forerunners of the regional/commuter
a i r l in e s  as they are known today.
In 1969 the Board recognized the need to establish a class of 
small,  noncert if icated scheduled a i r l in e s .  By amending Part 298 of i ts  
Economic Regulations, the Board defined the commuter a i r  c a rr ie r  as a 
Part 298 operator. According to Part 298, a regional/commuter a i r l in e  
was a c a r r ie r  which performed at least f iv e  round tr ips  per week between 
two or more points and published f l i g h t  schedules which specified the
times, days of the week and airports  between which such f l ig h ts  
operated. Part 298 also defined the regional a i r  ca rr ie r  as one which 
could transport mail under contract to the U.S. Postal Service.
The other scheduled c a r r ie rs ,  (trunk and local c a r r ie rs ) ,  came 
under Section 401 of the Board's regulations and were sometimes referred  
to as 401 ca rr ie rs .  The separation between the 401 ca rr ie r  and the
regional a i r l i n e  centered around a i r c r a f t  weight and, u lt im ate ly ,  to the 
number of passengers which could be hauled. To be exempt from the 401 
c e r t i f i c a t io n ,  a regional a i r l i n e  could not exceed a take-o ff  weight of 
12,500 pounds. This e f fe c t iv e ly  l imited the a i r c r a f t  to 19 passengers.
Over the years, these passenger and load l im ita t ions have been 
eased. A i r c r a f t  seating l im i t  was moved up to 30 passengers in 1972 and 
to 60 passengers in 1978 with the enactment of the A ir l in e  Deregulation 
Act (coupled with subsequent CAB approval) .  The Deregulation Act also 
increased the l im i t  for a l l -cargo payload to 18,000 pounds.
C. MARKETS SERVED
There are approximately 200 regional a i r l in e s  which serve the 
transportation needs of trave lers  across the United States. These
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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carr ie rs  extend the nation's scheduled a i r  service by providing service
to the small and medium sized communities. Many of the regional
c a r r ie r 's  routes cluster around large airports to exchange passengers
with the c e r t i f ic a te d  carr ie rs .  The integration of the regional
carr iers  into the common system of a i r  transportation is especially
important to the passengers these carriers serve. Approximately 70
percent of the passengers transported by regional carriers connect with
2
another a i r l in e  for the continuation of th e ir  journey.
The regional carr iers l ink  themselves into the nation's a i r  
transportation network through the larger airports generally in a "hub 
and spoke" fashion i . e .  hub representing the larger airports and spokes 
representing the travel to and from the smaller communities. In this 
manner, the regional a i r l in e  "feeds" the major carr iers .  Regional 
carr iers  can also feed passengers to the hub a irport  by u t i l i z in g  a 
l inear  route strategy. Both the hub and spoke route system and the 
l inear  route system are discussed below.
The successful regional ca rr ie r  provides timely, frequent service 
geared to the schedules of the ce r t i f ic a te d  carr ie rs ,  thus insuring 
convenient connections for  the passengers and shipments going to other 
destinations. As such, the regional carr iers must work closely with 
these carr ie rs .
Today, 98 percent of the airports in the U.S. which receive
3scheduled a i r  transportation are served by a regional a i r  ca rr ie r .  
These carr iers  now provide a i r  service to 853 communities which is more 
than a l l  other categories of a i r  carr iers combined. The importance of 
the commuter industry's role in the nation's a i r  transportation system
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
is  underscored by the fact that 619 or 71 percent of airports in North 
America receiving scheduled U.S. a i r  service rely solely on regional 
carr iers  for th e i r  a i r  service.^
D. GROWTH OF THE REGIONAL AIRLINES
Regional passenger t r a f f i c  has steadily grown since records were 
f i r s t  kept on the regional industry beginning in 1970. As noted below, 
the number of passengers enplaned on regional a i r l ines  totaled 4.27 
m ill ion  passengers in 1970. In 1984, this number had grown to 26.1 
m il l io n ,  an increase of over 6 fo ld .  The average number of passengers 
enplaned per ca rr ie r  has also seen a s ignif icant  increase in recent 
years. For example, in 1978 the average regional carr ie r  enplaned 
49,600 passengers while in 1984, this f igure had grown to 128,100
5
passengers per regional ca rr ie r .
COMMUTER PASSENGER TRAFFIC 1970 TO 1984' 
Passengers (mill ions) 26.1
26- 
24- 
2 2 -  
20 -  
18- 
16- 
14- 
12 -  
10-  
8 -  
6- 4.3
18.6
14.8
7.9
11.d
6.8
- 4 .  5.3 ,
YR 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 
As stated above, the number of passengers transported by the 
regional a i r l in e s  totaled 26.1 m il l ion  in 1984. Of this to ta l ,  96 
percent or 25.1 mil l ion  passengers were transported by the top 100 
regional carr ie rs .^  The top 50 carr iers carried 84 percent or 21.9
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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O
m il l ion  passengers. See Exhibit A for a l is t in g  of the top 50 
carr ie rs .
In terms of Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM), the top 100 carriers  
accounted 97 percent in 1984 and the top 50 regional a ir l ines  accounted
q
for 84 percent. Revenue Passenger Miles is a common and often referred
to measure in the industry which represents the number miles each paying
passenger t rave ls .  For example, i f  10 paying passengers travel on a 150
mile f l i g h t  the Revenue Passenger Miles would total 1500 miles. Using
1978 as a base index, a graphic i l lu s t ra t io n  can be presented comparing
the average t r ip  length to the number of passengers transported
result ing in the Revenue Passenger Miles. During this time period (1978
to 1984), the average t r ip  length steadily increased each year from 121
miles in 1978 to 160 miles in 1984.
TRAFFIC STATISTICS 1978 TO 1984 
(1978 INDEX)
300- /  RPM
250- X
225- jT Number of
200- X  Passengers
150- Trip Length
YR 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
The number of regional a i r l ines  in service in 1970 totaled 160
c a r r i e r s . A l t h o u g h  this number had grown to 221 carriers in 1984, i t
is down from an a l l - t im e  high of 277 carriers in 1981 and also down from
245 carr iers  in 1 9 8 2 . The number of a i r c r a f t  serving regional a ir l ines
has also shown s ign if icant  growth, increasing from 687 a i rc ra f t  in 1970
1 ?to 1915 a i r c r a f t  in 1984. This is the largest number of a i r c r a f t  which 
has served the regional a i r l in es  since records were f i r s t  kept in 1970.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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To transport the s teadi ly  increasing number of passengers, the 
regional carr ie rs  have also had to u t i l i z e  th e i r  a i r c r a f t  more 
e f f i c i e n t l y .  Since 1978, f l e e t  f ly in g  hours has steadily  increased 
along with the average number of hours per a i r c r a f t  as indicated below. 
The carr ie rs  have learned to operate th e ir  a i r c r a f t  not only more 
e f f i c i e n t l y  but also are matching th e i r  a i r c r a f t  to th e i r  routes. The 
Deregulation Act has enabled the regional ca rr ie r  to s t ra te g ica l ly  match 
a i r c r a f t  to market conditions. In doing so, the regional ca rr ie r  
optimizes the use of i t s  a i r c r a f t .
FLEET FLYING HOURS (000) 
2600- 
2400- 
2200 -  
2000 -  
1800- 
1600- 
1400- 
1200
1000— " 4- -  
YR= 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
)
[ 1)_ J---- 1— L.
AVE. HOURLY UTILIZATION/AIRCRAFT 
1700- 
1600- 
1500- 
1400- 
1300- 
1200-
1100-  
1000 
0
YR= 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
The average number of passenger seats per a i r c r a f t  has also 
steadi ly  grown since 1978 (more w i l l  be said on th is  subject below). 
Thus, the regional a i r l in e s  are becoming more aware of th e i r  operating 
environment by more e f f i c i e n t l y  u t i l i z in g  th e ir  a i r c r a f t  and matching 
larger a i r c r a f t  to th e i r  markets.
In summary, the top 100 regional carr iers  dominate the industry's  
to ta ls ,  accounting fo r  96 percent of a l l  passengers and 97 percent of 
the RPMs. The a i r c r a f t  u t i l i z e d  by the regional carr iers  are becoming 
larger and are being used more e f f i c i e n t l y  by th e i r  operators. The 
regional c a r r ie r 's  passenger t rave ls  an average of 160 miles per 
regional f l i g h t  and approximately 70 percent of a l l  U.S. regional
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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a i r l i n e  passengers connect with another a i r l i n e  during the course of 
th e i r  a i r  journey. Today, regional a i r l in e s  account for one-third of 
a l l  domestic f l ig h ts  and generate 8 .5 percent of a l l  departing passenger 
seats.
E. DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
The Deregulation Act of 1978 has probably been the most s ign if icant  
fac tor  affect ing  the development of the regional a i r l in e  industry since 
i t  was created in 1969. The passage of the Deregulation Act has caused 
the industry to have undergone some dramatic changes and i t  has created 
a new operational environment for  the regional c a r r ie r .  As such, an in -  
depth look at the basic provisions of the Act w i l l  provide a better  
understanding of the regional c a r r ie r 's  environment.
H is to r ic a l ly ,  the a i r l in e  industry has been regulated much the same 
as a public u t i l i t y .  In th is  manner, the industry was protected and 
nurtured as i t  developed. This assured the public of an orderly  
development of an a i r  transportation system. While the industry was in 
i t s  infancy, the protection afforded the emerging carriers was well 
intended and worked as designed. However as the industry matured, these 
same regulations which protected the carr ie rs  were also hindering the 
c a r r ie r 's  a b i l i t y  to expand and reach new markets. The A i r l in e  
Deregulation Act of 1978 modernized public policy towards the a i r l in e  
industry. The premise of the Deregulation Act recognized that  
competitive conditions w i l l  improve the q u a l i ty ,  variety and price of 
a i r  transportation in the United States.
By i t s  enactment of the Deregulation Act,  Congress assured service 
to the smaller communities. Provisions of the Act recognized the need
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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fo r  regional carr ie rs  and acknowledged the part these carr iers  would 
play in the future of the nation's a i r  transportation system.
The Act also included several provisions which gave the carr iers  
more f l e x i b i l i t y  and freedom. These included the c a r r ie r 's  a b i l i t y  to 
enter and e x i t  markets at w i l l ,  pricing freedom, the a b i l i t y  to match 
the proper size a i r c r a f t  to market conditions, the guarantee of 
Essential A ir  Service (EAS) to small and medium size communities and
subsidy programs for the EAS communities.
Free Market Entry and Exit
The Act provided the opportunity for  both the ce r t i f ic a te d  and
regional carr ie rs  to enter new markets or e x i t  those which were no 
longer p ro f i ta b le .  This has allowed a i r  carr iers  to realign th e ir  
routes to meet changes in demand while c a p ita l iz in g  on new market 
opportunities. This change has been fundamental to the success of the 
Deregulation Act.
The regional carr ie rs  benefited from th is  provision as the major 
and national ca rr ie rs  (previously trunk and local service carr iers
respectively) withdrew uneconomic j e t  service in the short-haul and
small community markets. The regional carr ie rs  were able to enter these 
vacated markets and provide replacement service. The Act also gave the 
regional c a r r ie r  the a b i l i t y  to commence service at existing underserved 
communities. The resu lt  of which has expanded the regional c a r r ie r 's  
ro le  in the small and medium size communities across the nation.
Pricing and Fare Freedom
Another key component of the Act was pricing f l e x i b i l i t y .  The 
Deregulation Act eliminated the CAB's authority  to regulate t a r i f f s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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e f fe c t iv e  January 1, 1983. However, from 1978 to January 1, 1983, the
CAB allowed the carr iers  to f re e ly  set th e i r  own fare  structure. In 
e f f e c t ,  the a i r l in e s  were permitted to o f fe r  any service and fare  
options desired. The wide array of prices and services which were 
available  a t  that  time i l lu s t r a t e  that this provision of the Act was 
used on a d a i ly  basis by a i r  c a r r ie r  management.
The Act also set a timetable by which a f u l l  phase out of fare and 
t a r i f f  regulation was to be accomplished. The gradual phase out of 
these regulations led to the complete deregulation of fares and t a r i f f s  
on January 1, 1983. Towards th is  end, the CAB eliminated many of the
passenger ru le  t a r i f f s  and allowed the f i l i n g  of a l l  but the most basic 
fare t a r i f f s .
Perhaps the traveling public benefited most from the pricing  
freedom which the carr iers  were afforded. This provision allowed the 
carr iers  to match t ic k e t  prices to market and operational conditions. 
Combined with the c a r r ie r 's  a b i l i t y  to move in and out of markets, many 
of the carr ie rs  reduced th e i r  a i r  fares in an e f fo r t  to a t t ra c t  
passengers in those locations where several carr iers  were competing with 
one another.
Joint Fares
The j o i n t  fare arrangement allowed passengers the convenience of 
purchasing only one t ic k e t  to board both the regional and major 
c a r r ie r 's  f l i g h t .  Oftentimes a j o i n t  fare arrangement can be less 
expensive to a l l  involved. This is because the regional c a r r ie r  is able 
to a t t r a c t  addit ional "feed" passengers and the major receives the 
"feed" t r a f f i c  more economically than i f  the major f l i e s  the route
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i t s e l f .  Consequently, lower fares can re s u l t .  The relationship between 
the regional and major c a r r ie r  is discussed in deta i l  in Section I I I .
A j o i n t  fa re  program involves a b i la te ra l  agreement between two
carr iers  which o ut l ine  the terms for  which a jo i n t  fare  is to be 
divided. The Act required that a mandatory jo in t  fare program be 
available  to regional a i r  carr iers  from 1978 u n t i l  January 1, 1983.
Prior  to the Deregulation Act,  few commuters and the communities they 
served received the benefits of j o i n t  fares.
The mandatory j o i n t  fare program was essential to the economic
v i a b i l i t y  o f  commuter services in maintaining service to small and
medium size communities. During the period 1978 to 1983 the regional 
a i r l in e s  were becoming of age. Absence of a mandatory program, may have 
caused many smaller carr iers  to be forced out of business. Today, there 
are no regulations as to how jo in t  fares are to be negotiated or as to 
how the revenue shall  be divided.
Increased A i rc ra f t  Size
Anticipating the need to use larger a i r c r a f t  for replacement
service in medium size markets, the A i r l in e  Deregulation Act (coupled
with subsequent action by the CAB) permitted the regional c a r r ie r  to
operate a i r c r a f t  up to 60 passenger seats and 18,000 pounds cargo
payload capacity. This had a beneficial  impact on the c a r r ie r 's  service 
in two ways. F i r s t ,  the regional carr ie rs  could use the la rge r ,  30 to 
60 passenger a i r c r a f t  on th e i r  ex is t ing ,  dense routes, thereby improving 
c a r r ie r  e f f ic ie n c y  and f l e x i b i l i t y .  Secondly, this released the 
regional c a r r ie r 's  smaller a i r c r a f t  for improved service on the less 
dense routes and/or freed the a i r c r a f t  fo r  use in the start -up  of new
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markets.
As a resu lt  of the carr ie rs  a b i l i t y  to economically match a i r c r a f t  
to current market conditions, a revolution in new a i r c r a f t  development 
began on a world wide scale. Under development today are a series of  
new generation, l ig h t  transport a i r c r a f t  which w i l l  provide regional 
a ir l in e s  with substant ia l ly  improved economy and th e i r  passengers with 
substantia l ly  improved comfort over many existing a i r c r a f t  now in use in 
the industry. The development of these new generation a i r c r a f t  w i l l  be 
discussed below.
Essential A ir  Service
The A i r l in e  Deregulation Act guaranteed a i r  service to the small 
and medium size communities in the form of the Essential A ir  Service 
(EAS) program. The EAS program ensured that e l ig ib le  communities 
receive a i r  transportation service fo r  10 years beyond the date of 
enactment into law on October 24, 1978.
A community became e l ig ib le  fo r  essential a i r  service designation 
when the next to the la s t  a i r  c a r r ie r  proposed to eliminate a l l ,  or most 
of i ts  scheduled a i r  service to that location. The CAB, and now the 
Department o f  Transportation (DOT), determines the minimum level of a i r  
service necessary to provide adequate community access to the national 
a i r  transportation system. This determination is based on h is tor ic  
information on the a i r  t r a f f i c  movement in to and out of the community. 
A maximum was also placed on the guarantee such that communities 
generating high levels of passenger t r a f f i c  would be termed s e l f  
s u f f ic ie n t  in a i r  service without EAS subsidy support.
I f  the la s t  remaining a i r  c a r r ie r  proposed to withdraw a l l  or
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substantia l ly  a l l  a i r  service, the agency would immediately seek a 
replacement c a rr ie r  w i l l in g  to provide service at the minimum essential 
le v e l .  I f  the agency was unable to secure a replacement c a r r ie r ,  the 
incumbent a i r l in e  would be required to maintain minimum service until  a 
suitable replacement ca rr ie r  were found.
Basically ,  the Act guaranteed that each community would receive an 
adequate number of seats and a minimum number of departures to large 
nearby connecting a irports .  This was to ensure the community's access 
to the national a i r  transportation system. Generally, the EAS program 
guaranteed a minimum of two da i ly  round tr ips  (sometimes fewer on the
weekends) to one or more of the hub airports .  The CAB also placed a
maximum on the number of seats guaranteed su ff ic ien t  to f i l l  an a i r c ra f t  
to a 50 -  65 percent load factor up to a maximum number of 80 seats. The 
CAB set this cap on guaranteed seats, believing that communities with 
more than 40 passengers per day can support subsidy-free a i r  service.
I f  additional service is required, i t  is believed that the a i r  carriers
wi l l  pick up the slack.
The significance of regional a i r l in es  serving essential a i r  service
communities is underscored by the fact  that in 1984, 320 or 97 percent
of the EAS communities in the United States (except Alaska) re l ied  on
13regional carr iers for th e i r  essential a i r  service. Of th is ,  251 
communities or 76 percent were served exclusively by the commuters as 
indicated below. In comparison, only 83 communities or 25 percent of 
the 320 points were served exclusively by the regional carriers in 1978. 
In 1978, major carr iers served 133 points or 42 percent exclusively. In 
1984, the major carr iers served only 10 points exclusively or a mere 3
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percent. These comparisons are i l lu s t ra te d  graghically below
NUMBER OF POINTS SERVED 
1984 MAJORS REGNAIS JOINTLY
251 251
■  104
15
14
H  69 
!■
RE MA RE MA 78 84 78 84 78 84
RE= Regional A ir l ines  MA= Major Air l ines
Subsidy For Essential Air Service
As part of the Essential Air Service program, a subsidy assistance
program was available to compensate a i r  carriers for losses incurred in
providing service to the e l ig ib le  EAS communities. The subsidy program
was used fo r  two purposes - to a t t rac t  new service to a community or,  to
sustain existing service in a community.
The subsidy program was used to secure replacement services at
e l ig ib le  essential a i r  service communities that otherwise could not
sustain economic service. Under this scenario, proposals were solic ited
from carr iers seeking to serve this community. The carr ie r 's  proposal
would specify the volume and quality  of service that would be provided
and include the level or rate of subsidy the ca rr ie r  required. The
agency would authorize the subsidy only to the extent necessary to
secure re l ia b le  a i r  service. In those communities that continue to
require f in a n c ia l ly  assisted a i r  service, the subsidy is substantial ly
lower than that paid to the existing j e t  carr ie rs .  This is attr ibuted
to the regional's  lower a i r c r a f t  operating costs.
I f  the Board was unable or was delayed in securing a replacement
a i r  c a r r ie r  at an e l ig ib le  point,  the incumbent ca rr ie r  would become
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e l ig ib le  for  compensation fo r  losses incurred while i t  was required to 
maintain mandated levels of a i r  service to that community.
The 406 Subsidy
Federal subsidies have played a very important part in securing a i r  
service to these small communities. Carriers which operated under what 
was called the Section 406 subsidy program, were paid a subsidy on a 
system-wide basis fo r  service to specified points on th e i r  route
structure. Under this arrangement, the c a rr ie r  was provided with a 12 
percent return on investment. With deregulation, the 406 subsidy was 
replaced with a new Section 419 subsidy program.
Congress however, appropriated a special fund to be equally 
distr ibuted to the former recipients of the Section 406 Subsidy unti l  
1985. A f te r  the Reagan Administration terminated the 406 subsidy
program e f fe c t iv e  January 1, 1983, Congress then again appropriated
$13.5 m i l l io n  through September 1983.
The 419 Subsidy
The 419 subsidy program which replaced the 406 subsidy, is
d is tr ibuted  on a point by point basis rather than on a system basis. 
When the la s t  c a r r ie r  pulls out o f  an EAS e l ig ib le  point,  the CAB 
s o l ic i ts  bids from other carr iers  who are interested in serving that  
point. The bid can be made e i th er  with or without subsidy.
The subsidy paid under the Section 419 program are for communities 
which are unable to support a i r  service on th e i r  own. With the 419 
subsidy program, the c a rr ie r  would agree to serve the EAS community for  
a two year period at a f ixed ra te .  The contract would specify the
number of passenger seats and frequency of service the c a r r ie r  is to
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provide.
The Deregulation Act has had a tremendous Impact on the development 
of the regional a i r l i n e  Industry. I t  provided both the regional and 
major c a r r ie r  the opportunity to f re e ly  enter and e x i t  markets, 
establish pricing and enabled the regional c a r r ie r  to operate and match 
larger a i r c r a f t  to the needs of the market. By design, the Deregulation 
Act provided the tools necessary for  the development of a more e f f ic ie n t  
transportation system. The Act also protected the regional ca rr ie r  by 
providing jo in t  fares and subsidies during the translt lonary period from 
1978 to 1983. This allowed the regional a i r l in e s  to develop and nurture 
not only the smaller communities which they served but also themselves.
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I I .  AIRCRAFT SERVING THE INDUSTRY 
A. AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY IN SERVICE
Regional a i r l in e s  u t i l i z e  a wide varie ty  of a i r c ra f t  that are 
p a r t ic u la r ly  well suited to the short-haul missions they perform. 
However, the 11 most popular a i r c r a f t  ( l is te d  on page 22) dominate the 
market by providing 80 percent of the industry's seating capacity. 
A irc ra f t  selected by the regional carr iers are based on such factors as 
t r i p  distance, passenger density, passenger or cargo use, and geographic 
or a irport  l im ita t ions which can dictate a i r c ra f t  size and performance 
requi rements.
As indicated below, more than 1900 a i r c ra f t  are employed in U.S. 
commuter passenger operations today. This is nearly three times the 
number of a i r c r a f t  which were operated by commuters in 1970. These 
a i r c r a f t  are becoming larger in s ize ,  increasingly turboprop, and 
generally higher in performance than those which the industry operated 
ju s t  10 years ago.
TOTAL AIRCRAFT OPERATED 1970 - 1984^
2500- 1915
2000 -  
1500-
1000- 687
500—
0——̂
YR 70
Unti l  1983, no a i r c r a f t  had been designed specif ica l ly  to meet the
needs of the regional a i r l in e  operator. The a i r c r a f t  which were being
used by the regional operator had to be adapted fo r  commuter
applications. As passenger and cargo t r a f f i c  increased and new markets
opened, the regional ca rr ie r  discovered that suitable a i r c ra f t  were in
short supply. A i rc ra f t  manufacturers responded by increasing production
18
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and announcing the introduction of fu ture  a i r c r a f t .
The a i r c r a f t  needs of commuter a ir l in e s  are being met by a wide 
range of new a i r c r a f t  models offered by manufacturers on a worldwide 
basis. The need fo r  performance, fuel e f f ic ie n c y , and dispatch 
r e l i a b i l i t y  have become primary factors in commuter purchase decisions 
and the manufacturers have responded accordingly. A discussion of some 
of these "new-generation" a i r c r a f t  w i l l  be undertaken below.
The development of the a i r c r a f t  used by the regional carr ie rs  began 
much before the enactment of the A ir l in e  Deregulation Act. I t  was 
through the evolutionary changes made by the CAB in creating the 
"trunkline" and " lo c a l" carr ie rs  that the regional a i r c ra f t  evolved from 
i t ' s  e a r ly ,  loosely defined " a ir  tax is" t i t l e  to i ts  current, c le ar ly  
defined position in the a i r  transportation industry. A review of th is  
period and the changes made as a re su lt  of the Deregulation Act provide
the background to the development o f the regional a i r c r a f t .
H istorica l Perspective
The results of the Local Service Experiment conducted in the 1940’ s 
indicated a need fo r  another type of a i r  service to serve the needs of 
the smaller, local communities. In 1947, the CAB created the second
level of a i r  c a rr ie r  -  the "local service" c a r r ie r .  The th ird  level of 
a i r  c a rr ie r  evolved from the re s tr ic t io n s  which were imposed by the CAB 
on the a i r c r a f t  which these carr ie rs  could operate i . e .  gross ta k e -o ff  
weight l im ita t io n s .  Hence, the three levels  of carriers were the
trunkline  c a rr ie rs ,  local service ca rr ie rs  and the a i r  ta x is .
A Product of Technology or Regulation
The th ird  level ca rr ie rs  were exempt from the Board's economic
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regulations and were lim ited  by Part 298 to a 12,500 pounds gross take­
o f f  weight. Therefore, i t  could be argued that the regional a ir l in e s  
were a product of regulation as opposed to technology. However, with 
the advent of the tu rb o je t ( j e t )  a i r c r a f t ,  the commercial transport 
industry vastly  expanded i ts  operational horizons and in doing so 
provided the local service carr ie rs  with the opportunity to f i l l  the 
vacancy created by the departure o f the trunk c a rr ie rs .
The new tu rb o je t a i r c r a f t  required more runway length in which to 
operate. Runways which accepted turboprop a i r c r a f t  would not always 
accept the new tu rb o je t a i r c r a f t .  Likewise, runways which accepted the 
older piston-powered a i r c r a f t  would not always accept the turboprops. 
Furthermore, operating economics d ictated that as equipment became 
larger and more co s tly , i t  had to be operated over longer stage lengths. 
In a regulated environment (p r io r  to the Deregulation Act of 1978), the 
long-haul runs were necessary to subsidize the short-haul.
Two phenomena were a t work. F i r s t ,  when runways became too short 
or the community was too small to support the larger a i r c r a f t ,  
replacement ca rr ie rs  were sought. At the same time, the th ird  level 
carr ie rs  were able to compete in some of these markets by o ffering  fewer 
seats but on a higher frequency basis.
A irc ra f t  Development Stunted by Regulation
Development o f a i r c r a f t  to the commuter industry was lim ited  by the 
CAE's Part 298-imposed 12,500 pound weight l im ita t io n  and an identica l  
penalty imposed by the FAA's Part 23 airworthiness standard fo r general 
av ia tio n  a i r c r a f t .  Up u n t i l  1983, not one a i r c r a f t  had been 
s p e c if ic a l ly  designed fo r the commuter operator. A ll of the a i r c r a f t
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used by the regional a ir l in e s  up to that point were o r ig in a l ly  designed 
fo r  other purposes and adapted fo r  use by the a i r l in e s .
The f i r s t  break-through came when the CAB, in 1972, raised i ts
l im ita t io n  on Part 298 a i r c r a f t  to 30 passengers and 7,500 pounds
payload. Later, the CAB fu rther increased the size l im ita t io n  to 56 
then 60 passenger seats. Even more s ig n if ic a n t  was the subsequent 
Special Federal Aviation Regulation 41C (SFAR 41C), which eliminated the 
weight l im ita t io n  on the 10 to 19 passenger seat a i r c r a f t .  By 
elim inating  the weight r e s t r ic t io n ,  SFAR 41C allowed both the 
manufacturers and operators of these a i r c r a f t  to gain the maximum 
possible in productiv ity . In short, SFAR 41C optimized the 19 passenger 
a i r c r a f t .
Today's Commuter Fleet
The composition of the commuter f le e t  has been s ig n if ic a n t ly  
influenced by certa in  regulatory constra ints . Restrictions lim ited the 
a i r c r a f t  size to: 10 or fewer seats u n t i l  1969 ( a i r c r a f t  which contained 
more than 10 seats had to meet the CAB's route c e r t i f ic a t io n  
requirements); 10 to 19 seats from 1969 to 1972; to 30 seats in 1972;
and to 56 seats in 1978 ( th is  was la te r  increased to 60 seats which is
where i t  stands today). The second influence on the composition of the 
regional f l e e t  was the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) 
requirement which lim ited to nineteen the number of passengers which 
could be carried  on the a i r c r a f t  without a cabin attendant.
Regardless of these regulatory constra in ts , t r a f f i c  density fo r the 
m ajority  o f regional routes also favored small a i r c r a f t .  However, since 
1978 there has been a gradual trend towards the use of larger a i r c r a f t .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
This was brought about by the transfer of j e t  routes to the regional
a ir l in e s  caused by the Deregulation Act and the increase in t r a f f ic
brought about by the regional c a rr ie r 's  development of the market.
Exhibit B provides a breakdown of the regional a i r c ra f t  by seating
capacity. I t  i l lu s tra te s  the growing trend among the regional a ir lin es
to acquire a i r c r a f t  of larger size.
Of the 1,915 a ir c r a f t  which served the regional a ir l in e  industry in
1984, 1,747 were dedicated to passenger transportation. The eleven most
popular a i r c ra f t  accounted fo r 58 percent of the to ta l a irc ra f t  used in
the industry but provided 80 percent of the to ta l industry seating
capacity. The most popular model in 1984 in terms of industry seating
capacity and f le e t  f ly in g  hours was the Fairchild  Metro. The Metro
provided 13.6 percent of the industry's seating capacity and was flown a
to ta l of 420.1 thousand hours. The following is a l is t in g  of the eleven
most popular a i r c r a f t  broken down by seating capacity, number of
2
a i r c r a f t ,  number of seats and to ta l f le e t  f ly ing  hours.
SEATING NO. OF NO. OF FLEET FLYG
AIRCRAFT CAPACITY AIRCRAFT SEATS HOURS
Fairchild  Metro 13.6% 191 19 420.1
Shorts 330/360 11.0 88 30/36 199.3
Fokker/FairchiId F27 8.3 55 50 106.2
deHavilland Dash 7 7.6 38 50 89.0
deHavilland Twin O tter 7.5 114 19 233.5
Embraer Bandeirante 7.3 111 18 240.9
Convair 580/500/640 6.0 54 44 79.7
Beech 99 5.9 119 15 232.1
Nihon YS 11 5.3 27 58 53.7
Fokker F28 4.1 12 85 29.2
Cessna 402 3.4 212 8 250.2
TOTAL 80.0% 1021 N/A 1,933.9
ALL OTHERS 20.0 726 N/A 1,830.2
TOTAL INDUSTRY 100.0% 1747 18.4 2,764.1
The 10 to 19 passenger a i r c r a f t  is the most popular seating 
capacity. This size category has dominated the to ta ls  since 1978 and
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today, provides approximately one-third of the industry's seating
capacity. However, the trend since 1978 has been towards the a ir c ra f t  
with larger capacity. For example, in 1978 the average capacity on a 
regional a i r l in e  was 11.9 seats but size has grown approximately 9 
percent per year to 18.4 seats in 1984 as shown below.^ This trend is 
expected to continue as the regional a ir l in e s  operate more e f f ic ie n t ly
within th e ir  markets and begin to accept delivery of the larger, new- 
generation a i r c r a f t .
A irc ra ft  U t i l iz a t io n
Likewise, the average annual u t i l iz a t io n  per a irc ra f t  has increased 
during th is  period as w ell. In 1978, the regional a ir lin es  u t i l iz e d  
th e ir  a i r c r a f t  an average of 1,080 hours per year.*  In 1984, the 
average annual use had grown to 1,580 hours representing an average
growth of 7.7 percent per year. This is also indicative of the regional
a ir l in e s  operating more e f f ic ie n t ly  in th e ir  markets and making better  
u t i l iz a t io n  of the larger a i r c r a f t .  This trend can be expected to 
continue as the regionals acquire the more e ff ic e n t turboprop a irc ra f t .
Average U t i l iz a t io n  (hours)
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Turbine Powered A irc ra f t
In 1983, and fo r the f i r s t  time since the inception of regional 
a ir l in e s ,  there were more turbine-powered a ir c ra f t  than piston powered. 
The turbine-powered a i r c ra f t  represented 54 percent the a irc ra f t  flown
c
by the regional a ir l in e s  in 1984. Of the eleven most popular a irc ra f t  
the regional industry, nine are turbine-powered. Not surprisingly, the 
turbine a i r c r a f t  flew more hours than the piston powered a irc ra f t  and 
accounted for 70 percent of the tota l hours flown by the regional 
a ir l in e s  and provided 83 percent of the available seats.^ This compares 
to 27 percent and 10 percent respectively for the piston powered 
a i r c r a f t .  This comparison is i l lu s tra te d  graphically below.
TOTAL FLEET HOURS FLOWN AVAIL. SEATS
100% -
TUR PST OTH TUR PST OTH TUR PST OTH
54% 43% 3% 70% 27% 3% 83% 10% 7%
TUR = Turbine PST = Piston OTH = Other ( je ts  and helicopters)
The trend toward the turbine-powered a i r c r a f t  is expected to 
continue amongst the regional carrie rs  because of the operating 
eff ic ie n c ie s  of the engine. As the price of fuel r ises , the turbine-
powered a i r c r a f t  are expected to become even more popular.
Seating Capacity
An analysis o f passenger a i r c r a f t  f le e t  by tota l number, 
u t i l i z a t io n ,  and revenue passenger miles by seating capacity, between
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the years 1978 and 1984, reveals some interesting information. In terms 
of to ta l f l e e t  a i r c r a f t ,  the 10 to 19 passenger a ir c ra f t  have grown the
7
most rap id ly  increasing 340 units to 610. The hours these a ir c ra f t  were 
flown also increased more than any other category, up 788 thousand hours
O
to 1.26 m il l io n ,  representing a 160 percent increase.
A irc ra f t  seating 40 passengers or more have shown the second most
g
rapid growth in terms of actual numbers, up 167 a i r c r a f t .  However, as 
a percentage of i ts  1978 base, these a i r c r a f t  have seen the most rapid 
growth of a l l  categories. In 1978 fo r instance, there were only 22 
a ir c r a f t  serving the regional a ir l in e s  which had 40 or more passenger 
seats. In 1984, there were 189 a ir c ra f t  in th is category. The hours 
these a ir c ra f t  were flown increased almost 14 fold to 341 thousand hours 
and the revenue passenger miles increased from 6 to 30 percent as a 
percentage of the to ta l t r a f f ic  as shown below.
The 20 to 39 passenger a ir c ra f t  have increased from 72 a irc ra f t  in 
1978 to 165 a i r c ra f t  in 1984, a 129 percent growth. Total hours flown 
by these a ir c ra f t  was up from 57 thousand hours in 1978 to 333 thousand 
hours in 1984. The revenue passenger miles as a percentage increased 
only s l ig h t ly  from 13 to 16 percent. A graphic i l lu s tra t io n  of the 
changes which have occurred between 1978 and 1984 in terms of passenger 
seating capacity follows. A comparison can be made re la t ive  to the 
number of a i r c ra f t  in regional a i r l in e  service and the total number of 
hours these a i r c r a f t  were flown.
Hence, a i r c r a f t  o ffering  20 passenger seats or more have shown the 
most dramatic growth during the past 5 years, increasing from 19 to 45 
percent of to ta l industry capacity. This is a noteworthy trend which is
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expected to continue especially in consideration of the new generation
a ir c r a f t  which were introduced beginning in 1984.
PASSENGER SEATING CAPACITY 
1 - 9  1 0 - 1 9  2 0 - 3 9  40 Plus
5 0 0 - H - H - ............■ ...............................................
A irc ra f t  4 0 0 - ^ g - ^ g ----------- ---------------------------------------------
in Fleet 3 0 0 - ^ 0 ---------------------------------------
'78 '84 '78 '84 '78 '84 '78 '84
Percent Chg. = 8% 126% 129% 759%
Hours
Flown
•78 '84 '78 '84 '78 '84 '78 '84
Percent Chg.= 31% 166% 484% 1382%
Revenue Passenger Miles as % of Total Shown: 
1978 = 22% 58% 13% 6%
1984 = 7% 37% 16% 29%
B. NEW GENERATION AIRCRAFT
The design, development, c e r t i f ic a t io n  and delivery of a new 
a i r c r a f t  is a lengthy and costly pro ject. A minimum of f iv e  years is 
required to move a new l ig h t  transport project from the drawing board to 
c e r t i f ic a t io n  and in i t i a l  de livery . Many regulatory, technical and 
market areas must be thoroughly researched prior to investing the 
m illions of dollars required to develop a new a i r c r a f t .  Regulations 
imposed on the manufacturer by the FAA are obviously an important 
consideration. However, i t  is the needs of the a ir c r a f t  user which must
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be f i r s t  analyzed. In other words, the a i r c r a f t 's  intended mission must 
be defined.
The regional a i r l in e  industry is seeking new a ir c ra f t  which w il l  
meet the more demanding role of a i r l in e  service. This means a fatigue  
l i f e  o f more than 30,000 f l ig h t  hours or 2,500 cycles per year (a cycle 
represents one f l ig h t  segment). The a i r c r a f t  should have a minimum l i f e  
expectancy of 12 to 15 years. This assumes the a ir c ra f t  w il l  be flown
2,000 to 2,500 hours per year.
Three new a i r c r a f t  have been introduced recently in the 15 to 19 
passenger c la s s if ic a t io n . These a ir c ra f t  are the Beech 1900, the 
Dornier 228-200, both 19 passenger a i r c r a f t ,  and the Dornier 228-100, a
15 passenger a i r c r a f t .  In the 20 to 39 passenger a i r c r a f t ,  there are
four new models being introduced. These a ir c r a f t  are the CASA-Nurtanio 
235 (34 to 40 passengers), deHavilland Dash 8 (36 passengers), Embraer 
B ras ilia  (30 passengers) and the SAAB-Fairchild 340 (35 passengers). In 
the 40 passenger plus a i r c r a f t ,  there are two new entrants, the 
A erospatia le /A erita lia  ATR-42 (42 to 49 passengers) and the BAe ATR -
Advanced Turboprop (64 passengers). One manufacturer (Fokker) renamed
an improved and up-dated version of two of i ts  older generation 
a i r c r a f t .  The Fokker/Fairchild F-27 was renamed the Fokker F-50 (50
passengers) and the Fokker F-28 was renamed the Fokker F-lOO (107 
passengers). These "new" a i r c r a f t  are scheduled for delivery in 
1986/1987.
Introduction of these a i r c r a f t  re f le c t  the growing needs of the 
regional a i r l in e  industry. They also a l l  represent developments since 
the Deregulation Act of 1978 and u t i l i z e  the most current technology.
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The scheduled de liveries  of these a i r c r a f t  range to 1987.
C. OPERATING/ACQUISITION ECONOMICS OF COMMUTER AIRCRAFT
One of the high ranking considerations of the regional a ir l in e
operator in making an equipment selection is the purchase price. The
prices fo r  new a i r c ra f t  under consideration range from approximately 
$1.5 m illio n  to $6.5 m illio n  or more fo r several of the new generation 
a i r c r a f t .  A frequently used index of transport a irc ra f t  price is 
expressing the price in terms of cost per seat. The purchase price per 
passenger seat ranges from about $80 thousand fo r a Twin O tter, to $150
thousand or more per seat fo r the new generation a i r c ra f t .  There are
considerable differences among these a ir c ra f t  in the level of capital 
commitment involved, and th is  range becomes even greater when used 
a ir c r a f t  and a i r c r a f t  which are no longer in production are considered 
in the purchasing decision.
The regional a i r l in e  executive must weigh the advantages offered by 
the new a ir c r a f t  against i ts  i n i t i a l  purchase price. To o ffse t the cost 
of a new a i r c r a f t  the c a rr ie r 's  breakeven load factor w il l  increase i . e .  
more revenue passengers w il l  have to be carried . Likewise, there is a 
tra d e -o ff  consideration a ffecting  a i r c r a f t  size selection. The more 
favorable unit cost per availab le  seat mile normally experienced with 
larger a i r c r a f t  must be balanced against the higher d irec t operation
cost per plane mile of the larger a i r c r a f t .
On routes where t r a f f ic  is s u f f ic ie n t ly  dense to provide an
adequate load fa c to r ,  the favorable seat mile costs of such a irc ra f t
becomes meaningful and therefore, p ro f i t  w il l  be maximized by selecting  
the larger a i r c r a f t .  Conversely, the seat mile cost advantage becomes
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academic where th in  t r a f f ic  results in too few seats actually  being 
occupied. This is an important competitive consideration as schedule 
frequency is emerging as a dominant factor with the traveling public. 
As a re s u lt ,  the c a rr ie r  operating too large an a i r c ra f t  is penalized in 
these markets where overall t r a f f i c  density is th in .
Operation Costs
The operating costs of a regional a i r l in e ,  both d irec t and 
in d ire c t ,  have the greatest impact on a regional a i r l in e 's  overall cost 
structure. Direct operation costs are those incurred in the process of 
producing a ir c r a f t  f l ig h t  capacity. Ind irect operation costs are those 
incurred for such things as advertising and sales development, t r a f f ic  
handling, and general and administration costs.
Direct Operational Costs
The regional a i r l in e 's  d irec t operational costs are most frequently  
broken into  four categories:
1. Fuel and o il expense;
2. A irc ra f t  maintenance expense;
3. F light operations expense;
4. A irc ra f t  depreciation and rental expense.
The largest of the four categories for c e rt if ic a te d  carriers  is 
fuel and o il  expense. The average c a rr ie r 's  fuel and o il  expense, 
expressed as a percentage of to ta l d irec t operating costs, ranged from a 
low of 29 percent to a high of 36 percent in 1984.^^ The combined 
average stood at 35 percent of to ta l d irec t operating costs. This 
equates to approximately $112 per a i r c r a f t  block hour for a re la t iv e ly  
modern 19 passenger a i r c r a f t ,  to a high of approximately $352 per 
a i r c r a f t  block hour fo r an older, 44 seat a i r c r a f t  which is no longer in 
production. Hence, one of the most important considerations of a
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regional a i r l in e 's  cost structure is fuel consumption and the price of 
fu e l .  Fuel consumption is prim arily  determined by the fuel effic iency  
of the a ir c ra f t  operated.
The next largest category of d irec t operating cost is a irc ra f t  
maintenance. A irc ra f t  maintenance expense includes the cost of labor 
and materials for maintenance and overhaul of the airframe, avionics, 
propellers and engines. This category also includes the cost of 
maintenance services provided by others and other associated maintenance 
overhead expenses.
In 1984, the average a ir c ra f t  maintenance expense for the regional 
a ir l in e  group was 29 percent of to ta l d irec t operation c o s t s . D u r i n g  
th is period, the range varied from a low of 12 percent of to ta l d irect  
operation costs, to a high of over 37 percent. This represented actual 
costs of $40 to $368 per a i r c ra f t  block hour respectively. The lower 
maintenance costs referenced above were associated with recently  
purchased new a i r c ra f t  while the higher costs were associated with an 
older design 44 passenger a i r c ra f t  no longer in production. Needless to 
say, the age of the a ir c r a f t  plays a very large role in the maintenance 
expense. The maintenance and overhaul expense category is probably the 
largest contro llab le expense of the regional a i r l in e .
F light operations represent the th ird  largest d irec t operating cost 
category. This category includes p i lo t  and cabin attendant pay, related  
payroll expenses fo r benefits and pensions, payroll and other taxes, 
t ra in ing  expenses, cost of supplies and insurance expense. F light  
operations expense represented 21 percent of to ta l d irec t operation cost 
fo r a l l  c e r t i f ic a te d  regional a ir l in e s  in 1984.^^ The f l ig h t  operation
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costs ranged from a low of 17 percent to a high of 26 percent. An 
a ir l in e  can lower these expenses by operating a single type of a i r c ra f t  
as opposed to operating several d if fe re n t  type of a i r c ra f t  which require 
special crew ratings fo r each a i r c r a f t .  For example, a i r c ra f t  which 
weigh more than 12,500 pounds require p ilo ts  to receive special tra in ing  
and a type-rating in th at make of a i r c r a f t .  A ll other factors being 
equal, the more diverse an a i r l in e 's  f le e t ,  the more d i f f i c u l t  i t  
becomes to c ro s s -u t i l ize  p ilo ts .
The la s t  and smallest of the four elements which make up d irec t
operation cost is depreciation and rental expense. This includes
depreciation fo r airframes and engines, amortization of capital leases
of f l ig h t  equipment and f l ig h t  equipment renta ls . In 1984, this
category represented approximately 15 percent of to ta l d irec t operation
13costs and ranged from a low of 6 percent to a high of 28 percent. The 
lowest was achieved by an operator whose f le e t  consisted of a single 
type of older a i r c r a f t  and the largest was achieved by an operator who 
recently added new a i r c ra f t  to the f le e t .  Not surpris ingly , this new
f le e t  also had the lowest maintenance expense as a percentage of to ta l
d irec t operation costs.
In summary, the d irec t operation cost (D.O.C.) consists of four 
categories -  Fuel and O i l ,  Maintenance, F lig h t Operations, and 
Depreciation and Rental Expenses. Although these costs do not represent 
the to ta l costs associated with operating an a i r c r a f t ,  they do represent 
a substantial concern to the operator. As a percentage of the d irec t  
operation cost each of the four categories can be broken down as 
follows :
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Fuel and Oil Expense................................35%
Maintenance Expense.................................. 29%
Flig h t Operations Expense..................... 21%
Depreciation and Rental Expense 15%
Direct Operating Costs By A irc ra f t  Size
An independent f irm . Aviation Consulting Incorporated, analyzed the
d irec t operation costs of each of the a irc ra f t  types serving the
regional a i r l in e 's  by seat c a p a c i t y . B a s e d  upon manufacturers
performance data and applying a common set of assumptions to each cost
category (depreciation, insurance, f l ig h t  crew, maintenance and fu e l) ,
Aviation Consulting Incorporated compared the a irc ra f t  on a typical 150
nautical mile t r ip .  The a irc ra f t  were broken down into three size
categories; 15 to 19 seats, 20 to 40 seats and 41 to 50 seats.
The ranges of cost per available seat mile and the cost per plane
mile fo r each of the three size categories is i l lu s tra te d  in Exhibit C.
The results of the analysis show that the cost per seat mile in the 15
to 19 seat a i r c ra f t  vary from 11.5 to 13.9 cents per seat m ile, a 20
percent varia tion . The 20 to 40 passenger a irc ra f t  varied from 9.7 to
13.8 cents per seat mile which is a re la t iv e ly  high 40 percent
v a r ia tio n . The 40 to 50 seat a i r c ra f t  varied s l ig h t ly  between 10.4 to
11.0 cents per seat m ile. As would be expected, there is a modest
decrease in the cost per seat mile as the size of a irc ra f t  increases.
The cost per plane mile portion of the graph deplicts a somewhat
d if fe re n t  p icture. The range of per plane mile costs for the a irc ra f t
in the small category is re la t iv e ly  narrow (10 percent), but grows wider
fo r  both the medium size category (28 percent), and the large category
(25 percent). The differences in per plane mile costs between the
categories is even more dramatic. The mid-point of the cost per plane
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mile range for the medium size a ir c r a f t  category is almost 50 percent 
more than the mid-point range fo r the small category. The same 
re lationship  holds true between the large and medium categories, with 
the mid-point of the cost per plane mile range for the large category 
being almost 50 percent greater than the corresponding point fo r the 
medium category. The costs per plane mile are highly s ign ificant and 
therefore, i t  is important fo r  the regional a i r l in e  operators to 
care fu lly  choose the size of the a ir c ra f t  which best suits the intended 
market.
Fuel Price S ens it iv ity
Aviation Consulting Incorporated analzed the costs per seat mile 
and per plane mile with a fuel price increase from current cost of $1.00 
to $1.50 per gallon but held a l l  other factors constant. The impact of 
the increase in fuel costs is i l lu s tra te d  in Exhibit D. As reflected in 
Exhibit D, the overall impact of a 50 percent fuel price increase would 
be an increase to the cost per seat mile and the cost per plane mile for  
these regional a ir l in e s  of between 9 and 14 percent. As i l lu s tra te d  in 
the graph, the impact of the price increase on d irec t operation costs in 
percentage terms is almost identical fo r  a l l  categories. This serves to 
i l lu s t r a te  that the regional a ir l in e s  are less sensitive to fuel price 
changes than other categories of cost. This fa c t  is a tr ib u te  to 
turboprop fuel e ff ic iency .
Ind irec t Operating Costs
In d irec t operating costs include the cost of a l l  a c t iv i t ie s  needed 
to carry out the operation which are not included in d irect operating 
costs. These include such expenses as advertising and sales expenses.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
t r a f f i c  handling expenses, and general administrative and overhead 
expenses. According to Aviation Consulting Incorporated, ind irec t
operating costs accounted fo r  approximately 39 percent of the regional 
carr ie rs  to ta l costs. The remaining 61 percent was comprised of the 
operators d irec t operating costs. This ra t io ,  61 vs 39, has held 
constant since 1979.
In conclusion, fuel and maintenance are the two largest categories 
of regional a i r l in e  operating costs, representing 35 and 29 percent 
respectively of average d irec t operating costs. Together these two 
account fo r  40 percent o f the regional c a rr ie r 's  to ta l operating costs. 
The significance of these numbers i l lu s tra te s  the importance of the 
regional c a rr ie r  operating fuel e f f ic ie n t  a i r c r a f t  and the need of an 
e f f ic ie n t  maintenance program. The evidence would indicate that a 
regional a i r l in e  operator needs to implement and maintain aggressive 
management controls.
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I I I .  PROBLEMS FACING THE INDUSTRY
The problems experienced in the regional a i r l in e  industry are 
sim ila r  in many respects to those experienced in other industries. 
However, each industry has problems which are peculiar unto i t s e l f  and 
the a i r l in e  industry is no exception.
The problem areas which w il l  be discussed are those which may or
may not represent a problem to each c a rr ie r  and are by no means a l l  
inclusive of the problems facing the regional a i r l in e  industry. Rather, 
these problems are concerns to most of the carriers regardless of th e ir  
re la t iv e  financia l position or standing in the industry. Each regional 
c a rr ie r  must at one time or another, address the three following issues 
-  financing, competition, and the company's corporate goals, which may 
be described as the re lationship  between i t s e l f  and major a ir l in e s .  
Each of these w il l  be discussed in general terms and w il l  be analyzed as 
generic areas of concern to the regional c a rr ie r .
The finance section w il l  cover the a lternatives which are available  
to the regional operators in financing a i r c r a f t ,  along with the merits 
of each a lte rn a t iv e .  The a lternatives include Federal programs, 
tra d it io n a l bank funding, leasing, public sources and manufacturer
support programs.
The second area of concern to most regional carriers  is
competition. The Deregulation Act opened the doors of competition and 
the regional a i r l in e  industry has had to adjust accordingly. Not only 
must the regional a i r l in e  compete with other a i r  carriers but also with 
the automobile. In th is  section, the competition between carriers and 
with the automobile is evaluated.
35
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F in a l ly ,  consideration is given to the relationship between 
regional a ir l in e s  and the major c a rr ie rs . In the past, regional 
a ir l in e s  have gone re la t iv e ly  unnoticed by the major ca rr ie rs . However, 
major carrie rs  have recently discovered that the regional c a rr ie r  is 
able to economically provide them with a v i ta l  l ink  to th e ir  success. 
Today, major carr ie rs  ac tive ly  seek relationships with the regional 
c a rr ie r  and likew ise , some regional carriers pursue in te r l in e  
relationships with these ca rr ie rs . These relationships are not without 
drawbacks however, and some of the regional carriers fear th is  
re lationship  w il l  spell the end of the independent regional a i r  c a rr ie r .
A. FINANCING
The a ir l in e  industry is a very heavily capital intensive industry. 
Robert Priddy, vice president of A tlan tic  Southeast A irlines (ASA) 
states " I t  is d i f f i c u l t  to make money in th is business. There are 
massive capital requirements."^ Compared to other transportation  
industries , the a ir  transportation industry's long-term debt to equity 
ra t io  is higher than any other segment of the transportation industry. 
For example, the a i r  transportation 's long-term debt to equity ra t io  is 
1.24, compared to .38 fo r ra ilroads , .13 fo r trucking and .85 for the 
maritime industry. In addition, the c a r r ie r 's  creditworthiness has 
made i t  even more d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the c a rr ie r  to obtain funding fo r i t s '  
a i r c r a f t .  The 1984 Airfinance Journal stated: "Airlines in the U.S.
have tended to f a i l  creditworthiness tests by v ir tu e  of deteriorating  
balance sheets." Consequently, the financing of the c a rr ie r 's  a i r c ra f t  
and equipment has become one of the foremost challenges facing th is  
industry.
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Prior to hauling i t ' s  f i r s t  customer, the a i r  c a rr ie r  w il l  invest a 
considerable amount of time and money to create the necessary 
environment in which to operate. The c a rr ie r  must i n i t i a l l y  establish a 
legal existence in the s ta te (s ) in which i t  w il l  be operating (business 
license and incorporation), and with the appropriate federal agencies, 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Department of 
Transportation (DOT). A fu rth e r investment is required to secure 
appropriate f a c i l i t i e s  a t each a irp o rt such as t ic k e t  counters, computer 
terminals, o ff ic e  space, baggage claim and handling areas. In 
conjunction with these a c t iv i t ie s ,  the c a rr ie r  must hire and tra in  
personnel to manage and operate i ts  f a c i l i t i e s  and equipment. However, 
the c a r r ie r 's  largest investment begins with the acquisition of the 
a ir c r a f t  and related ground support equipment.
Prices for an a i r c r a f t  which is adaptable to regional service, 
range from a low of $100,000 fo r  a used l ig h t  twin engine, piston- 
powered a i r c r a f t  to over $6.0 m illio n  for one of the new generation 
a i r c r a f t .  Each represents substantial investments to the a ir l in e s  which 
would be purchasing th is  equipment. For example, a c a rr ie r  starting a 
new operation would probably choose the smaller and less expensive 
a ir c r a f t  u n til  market volume was known and i ts  financial position was 
stab le . An established c a rr ie r  evaluating one of i ts  known markets 
would be better able to ju s t i f y  the purchase of the more expensive 
a i r c r a f t .
To understand how regional a ir l in e s  acquire these a i r c r a f t ,  one 
must understand the entrepreneurial s p i r i t  of the industry's f i r s t -  
generation management. Generally, the a i r c r a f t  purchased by these
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managers were funded through the a i r l in e 's  local bank. More often than 
not, the bank’ s approval was based on the financia l strength and 
in te g r ity  of the individual backing the loan and not s t r ic t ly  on the 
a i r l in e  i t s e l f .  Today, the regional a ir l in e s  have become better known 
and accepted and have a varie ty  of potential f inancia l sources from 
which to draw.
The Deregulation Act has had a very s ig n if ican t a ffe c t on the 
regional c a rr ie r 's  a b i l i t y  to obtain funding fo r i ts  a irc ra f t  purchases. 
Regional carr ie rs  generally have found a ir c r a f t  financing to be 
availab le since the enactment of the Deregulation Act. This is because 
the Act formally recognized the important role the regional carriers  
would play in meeting the a i r  service needs of the small and medium 
sized communities. Provisions of the Act have included the Essential 
A ir  Service program, mandated jo in t  fares , federa lly  subsidized payments 
fo r a i r  service into small communities and the a v a i la b i l i ty  of Federal 
loan programs. The Act has contributed greatly  to the economic 
s ta b i l i t y  of short-haul a i r  transportation and the regional a i r  ca rr ie r .  
Federal Finance Programs
The Deregulation Act renewed the FAA loan program and extended 
coverage to regional a i r  carriers  fo r the f i r s t  time. Under th is  
program, which expired October 23, 1983, regional carriers were e l ig ib le  
fo r  fe d e ra lly  guaranteed loans, up to $100 m illio n  per c a rr ie r ,  for the 
purchase of new or used a i r c r a f t  and related spare equipment. 
Previously these programs were only availab le to the subsidized local 
service c a rr ie rs .
The terms of the program called for a minimum down payment of 10
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percent or more from the c a r r ie r ,  with the balance financed by a 
commercial bank. The government would then guarantee repayment of 90 
percent of the outstanding loan balance. The e ffe c t  was an 81 percent 
loan guarantee from the government. This program provided many banks 
with the cushion necessary to approve some loan applications which might 
otherwise have been denied.
The to ta l guarantees approved under th is program for the regional 
carr ie rs  during the period from 1978 through 1983, represented a value 
of $110.5 m illio n  on 65 a i r c r a f t  and involved 36 individual
4
transactions. Like many other government supported credit programs, 
the use of the program diminished sharply a f te r  i ts  in i t ia l  
introduction. The most a c t iv i ty  was experienced during fisca l year 1980 
with 16 loans on 34 a i r c r a f t  which were valued at $45 m illio n . Fiscal
year 1982 involved only 3 loans for 5 a ir c r a f t  valued at $19.9 m illio n .
In comparison, during th is same period the local service carriers  
received 19 approvals on 66 a ir c ra f t  valued at $602.5 m illio n . Local
service carriers  were the only other a ir l in e  group allowed to receive
c re d it  support since the Deregulation Act and then only for the fisca l  
years 1981 and 1982.
A second federal program used by the regional ca rr ie r  is the 
Business and Industria l Loan Program administered by the Farmers Home 
Administration (FmHA). The purpose of th is program is to promote 
business and industry in rural communities. Regional a ir lin es  can use 
the FmHA program to guarantee financing fo r a i r c r a f t ,  equipment spares, 
f a c i l i t i e s ,  tra in ing  and other re lated costs. In order to qua lify  for 
the program, the c a rr ie r 's  f a c i l i t i e s  or the communities to which they
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provide a i r  service must be located in rural areas of 50,000 population 
or less. This FmHA program was in i t ia te d  jus t one year prior to the 
Deregulation Act and, since 1977, more than 20 regional a ir l in e s  have 
received loan guarantees from the FmHA to ta lin g  $15 m illio n .^
The significance of the these federa lly  supported programs l ie s  not
in the number of transactions which occurred or in the millions of
dollars which were involved but ra ther, in i t s '  recognition of the 
regional carr ie rs  as a group. Prior to the Deregulation Act, these 
carrie rs  had to re ly  prim arily  on the financial support of th e ir  local 
banks. These federal programs exposed the regional a ir l in e  industry to 
the financia l community on a national le v e l,  and played a very important 
ro le in the development o f the regional carriers  standing in the
financia l community. Today, financial in s titu tio ns  across the country 
have dedicated commuter finance departments which active ly  s o l ic i t
business from the regional a ir l in e s .
Other than the fed era lly  sponsored programs referenced above, the 
regional a ir l in e s  u t i l i z e  four basic means to secure funding for 
a i r c r a f t .  Each method has i ts  own d is t in c t  advantage(s) and the 
c a r r ie r 's  selection w il l  be based upon the advantages each a lte rn ative  
offers the c a rr ie r  re la t iv e  to the c a r r ie r 's  individual financial 
position and goals. In selecting one of the a lte rnatives , the c a rr ie r  
must f i r s t  weigh the contributions each a lte rn a tive  makes to the 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of the company then determine i f  the advantages of that  
a lte rn a tiv e  are consistant with the goals of the a i r l in e .  The four 
a lte rn a tives  are;
1. Traditional Debt (Bank) Financing
2. Leasing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
a. Finance Lease
b. Operating Lease
c. Leveraged Lease
3. Public Sources
4. Manufacturer Support
The purpose of th is  section is to i l lu s t r a te  some of the methods and 
alternatives  availab le  to the operators and not to delve into the 
specifics of comparing "numbers" of each a lte rn a tiv e . Instead, each 
a lte rn a tiv e  w il l  be reviewed with the idea of comparing the re la t iv e  
advantages and disadvantages of one a lte rn a tive  to another. For only 
with an exact set of circumstances could one e ffe c t iv e ly  compare and 
choose the a lte rn a tive  which would best benefit that particu lar regional 
c a rr ie r .
Debt Financing
Debt or bank financing has been the long-standing method of 
acquiring a i r c r a f t .  The terms are usually standard and include a down 
payment of between 10 and 25 percent with the balance financed at an 
agreed upon rate of in te rest over a period varying from 3 to 10 years. 
The actual terms of the loan agreement would be negotiated and depend 
upon the bank's experience with the customer, the type and age of the 
a i r c r a f t ,  the prevailing financia l environment and upon the negotiating 
s k i l ls  of the parties.
Debt financing allows the owner (a i r l in e )  to retain  the rights of 
ownership, and herein l ie s  i t ' s  primary advantage. Under this  
arrangement, the a i r l in e  acquires the t i t l e  to the a irc ra f t  by way of 
i t ' s  down payment. The funding source takes a f i r s t  position in the 
equipment with the execution and f i l i n g  of a chattel mortgage agreement 
or a security  agreement. This arrangement allows the c a rr ie r  the use of
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the equipment and the benefits of ownership, including an equity 
position in the a i r c r a f t .
The rights o f ownership allow the c a rr ie r  to depreciate the 
equipment, claim the Investment Tax Credit (ITC) and to deduct the 
in te rest portion of the loan payment from the c a rr ie r 's  accounting and 
tax books. The a i r c r a f t  can be depreciated over several years ranging 
from 3 to 10 years depending upon the age of the a irc ra f t  and upon tax 
and internal bookkeeping considerations i . e .  depreciation under 
Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) rules for tax purposes and under 
a d if fe re n t  method or scale fo r financial internal statement purposes. 
The ITC ranges from 8 to 10 percent of the equipment cost, depending on 
the method of depreciation, and results in a d irec t reduction of the 
carriers  income tax l i a b i l i t y .  From a tax standpoint, the benefits of 
ITC and depreciation become s ig n if ica n t only when the c a rr ie r  is 
p ro fita b le . I f  the c a rr ie r  is not, these potential benefits cannot be
f u l l y  realized  in a year of loss or low earnings.
One of the disadvantages of debt financing is the large amount of 
cash necessary to support the transaction. The required down payment 
along with the monthly obligation makes debt financing precarious fo r
some companies due to the heavy cash drain. The acquiring company w il l  
re a lize  a cash in -flow  some years down the road when the a ir c ra f t  is  
sold. However, fo r  a l l  practical purposes, i t  takes several years
before enough equity is b u i l t  up to make a s ign ificant increase in 
value. The length of time a c a rr ie r  keeps i ts  a ir c ra f t  ranges from 3 to 
8 years. Thus, the impact of the eventual sale is ins ign ifican t when 
evaluating the early  years cash flow. This is an important
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consideration when comparing the acquisition a lternatives availab le .  
Leasing
The lease option is re la t iv e ly  new but has become very popular in 
the regional a i r l in e  industry. There are two main types of lease
contracts -  the finance lease and the operating lease. I t  is important
to distinguish the difference between each type since they frequently  
have an e ffe c t  on the accounting treatment, legal rights and the price  
structure of the rental payments to the c a rr ie r .
The finance lease is s im ila r  to tra d it io n a l bank financing in that
the leasing company acts simply as a lending in s t itu t io n . The ca rr ie r  
or lessee, specifies the equipment needed and acts as the leasing 
company's agent in the ordering, inspection and maintenance of the 
equipment. The leasing company (lessor) has recourse against the lessee 
in the event of the c a r r ie r 's  fa i lu re  to make the lease payments. Under 
th is arrangement, the payments are structured such that during the 
primary term of the lease, the rentals paid to the lessor w il l  cover the 
f u l l  cost of the equipment plus in te res t and the lessors p r o f i t .  Hence, 
the lessor receives a return on the investment during the primary 
period.
The finance lease is recognized on the carriers  accounting books as 
a purchase (an asset with an o ffse tt in g  l i a b i l i t y  entry) since i t  
generally meets one or more of the 3 c r i te r ia  set forth by the 1RS. 
These are:
1. A bargain purchase price at the end of the 
lease i . e .  below Fair Market Value (FMV);
2. The lease term is greater than or equal to 
75 percent of the estimated useful l i f e  of 
the a i r c r a f t ;
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3. The present value of the minimum lease payment
is greater than or equal to 90 percent of the
acquisition price of the a i r c ra f t .
The operating lease is s im ila r to the finance lease in many
respects. As with the finance lease, the lessee generally specifies the 
equipment and acts as the lessors agent in much the same manner as 
outlined above. Likewise, the lessor w il l  purchase the equipment and 
lease i t  back to the lessee. However, the lessor leases the equipment 
to the lessee at a rate and term which does not cover the lessor's cost, 
in te res t and p r o f i t .  The lessor achieves i ts  return by e ith er re ­
leasing or se lling  the equipment a f te r  the primary (specified) term of 
the lease agreement. The lessor may lease the a ir c ra f t  to the same or
another c a rr ie r  under new terms or may se ll the equipment outright. The
lessor re l ie s  on i ts  a b i l i t y  to remarket the equipment a fte r  the primary 
term expires in order to achieve i ts  required return.
The importance in distinguishing between the operating and finance 
lease frequently extends beyond the difference in the rental payments to 
the c a rr ie r .  Operating leases are accounted for in d if fe re n t  ways, but 
the primary difference is that the operating lease is not cap ita lized  on
the books of the lessee since i t  generally does not meet the c r i te r ia
set fo rth  above. For these reasons, the operating lease is more popular 
with the regional c a rr ie rs .
As indicated above, leasing o ffers  many advantages over 
conventional bank financing and is p a rt ic u la r ly  well suited to capital 
Intensive industries such as the a i r l in e  industry. The reasons for the 
popularity  of the lease re la te  to the increased financial f l e x ib i l i t y  
th is  type of arrangement allows the regional c a rr ie r  as developed below.
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In i t ia l  Cash Outlay
Leasing allows the regional c a rr ie r  to acquire a irc ra f t  with less 
cash outlay than conventional bank or debt financing. Conventional bank 
financing requires a minimum down payment of between 10 and 25 percent 
whereas leasing requires no down payment. Depending on the negotiating  
s k i l ls  of the parties and the circumstances of the transaction, the only 
advance payment made by the c a rr ie r  (lessee) would be the requirement of 
one or more monthly lease payments. With l i t t l e  or no in i t i a l  capital 
outflow, the regional c a rr ie r  preserves i ts  cash fo r other purposes. 
With the heavy cash requirements of the regional c a rr ie r ,  th is advantage 
is seen by some as the primary motivating factor fo r using leasing. 
Credit Lines
Regional ca rr ie rs  usually w il l  establish a l in e -o f -c re d it  with a 
local bank and generally , leasing w il l  not a ffe c t  th is l in e -o f -c re d it .  
A l in e -o f -c re d it  is extremely important to the regional c a rr ie r  because 
of the capital intensive nature of the a i r l in e  industry and fluctuating  
cash flows experienced by the regional ca rr ie rs . In order to optimize 
the use of this l in e ,  regional carrie rs  seek a lte rn a tive  finance sources 
to fund a i r c r a f t  and equipment acquisitions. U t i l iz in g  other finance 
sources preserves the carr ie rs  l in e -o f -c re d it  fo r  other purposes.
U t i l iz in g  another source of funds also broadens the carrie rs  
financia l source base as w e ll.  This creates new f l e x ib i l i t y  fo r the 
c a rr ie r .  Since the c a rr ie r  now has more than one source of funds 
a v a ila b le , the a i r l in e  is in a better position to negotiate the terms of 
a new loan/lease agreement (assuming the c a rr ie r  is in a financia l  
position to acquire new equipment).
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Investment Tax C red it and Accelerated Cost Recovery System
As the purchaser and owner of the a i r c r a f t ,  the leasing company is 
e n tit le d  to the benefits o f ownership i . e .  Investment Tax Credit (ITC) 
and depreciation via the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS). By 
i t s '  design, leasing allows the regional c a rr ie r  to take advantage of 
these benefits whether the c a rr ie r  receives the benefits d ire c t ly  or 
in d ire c t ly  from the leasing company.
The leasing company can e ith e r  accept and apply the ITC d ire c t ly  on 
i t s '  books ( fo r  tax purposes) or i t  can pass the ITC to the a i r l in e .
This point is usually negotiated at the time the lease rates are
discussed. I f  the regional ca rr ie r  wants the benefits of the ITC to
apply d ire c t ly  on i ts  books, the leasing company can pass the ITC to the 
c a rr ie r 's  benefit .  However, i f  the regional a i r l in e  does not want or 
need the ITC, the leasing company can reduce the price structure to the 
c a rr ie r  in the form of reduced monthly payments. This re flec ts  the
leasing company's lower cost of equipment in the form of the ITC cred it .  
Hence, the c a rr ie r  benefits e ith er way, with the ITC applied d irec tly
against i t s '  taxes or in the form of reduced monthly payments.
Equally s ig n if ica n t is the ACRS program which allows the owner of 
the a i r c r a f t  to accelerate i ts  w r i te -o f f  of the asset over a 5 year 
period. In the f i r s t  two years, the owner is allowed the w r ite -o f f  15 
and 22 percent respectively of the asset's cost, in years 3 through 5, 
the write-down is 21 percent per year. This again allows the owner to 
reduce i t s '  cost since the asset w il l  be depreciated on an accelerated 
basis. The leasing company is then able to pass the reduced cost to the 
lessee/regional c a r r ie r  in the form of reduced payments. I f  the asset
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were depreciated on a s tra ig h t- l in e  basis over 10 or 12 years, the 
w r ite -o f f  would be approximately 1/2 of what is i t  is under ACRS rules 
and would resu lt in higher monthly payments to the regional c a rr ie r .  
For example, an a i r c r a f t  with a $2.0 m illion  depreciatable value, the 
application of an ACRS w r i te -o f f  versus a 10 year s tra ig h tlin e  w r ite -o f f  
compares as follows:
YR. ACRS STR.LN.
~  3ÔÔ -TOO—
2 440 100
3 420 100
4 420 100
5 420 100
6-10 0 100/yr.
Current tax laws allow the regional c a rr ie r  to benefit from the use
of ITC and ACRS and a change in the laws regulating th e ir  application
would have a d irec t impact on the cost to the regional a i r l in e .
Currently, leg is la t io n  is proposed which would have an e ffe c t on the use
of ITC and ACRS. The program proposes to eliminate ITC and extend the
ACRS write-down period on a i r c r a f t  from 5 to 12 years. The passage of
th is  leg is la tio n  would have a dramatic e ffe c t  on the cost of financing
the regional c a rr ie r 's  a i r c r a f t .
Miscellaneous Considerations
Additional considerations which may be of importance to regional
operators include the removal of the residual value risk and the o f f -
balance sheet accounting that leasing may provide. Some regional
carr ie rs  may choose not to show the leased a ir c r a f t  on th e ir  accounting
books and instead, disclose the lease as an accounting footnote. This
type of accounting is possibly a very valuable consideration in weighing
the a lte rn a tive s .
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Leasing also places the burden of residual value risk  with the 
leasing company and not with the regional c a rr ie r .  With the growth 
experienced by the regional industry, a i r c r a f t  which are being u t i l iz e d  
today may not be used by that same c a rr ie r  in the future . For example, 
a c a rr ie r  s ta rting  a new operation may begin with an eight passenger 
Cessna 402. In f iv e  years, the market served by th is c a rr ie r  may 
increase to ju s t i fy  a 19 to 35 passenger a i r c r a f t ,  never to return to 
the eight passenger Cessna. Therefore, the c a rr ie r  may prefer not to 
have the responsib ility  of disposing of the a ir c ra f t  at the end of the 
lease term. In e f fe c t ,  the r isk  of low residual value is not borne by 
the regional c a r r ie r .  As w il l  be discussed below, the residual value 
risk  can also be a disadvantage to the c a rr ie r .
Hence, the leasing a lte rn a tive  allows the regional c a rr ie r  greater 
f l e x i b i l i t y  in many respects. Generally, the c a rr ie r  is able to use the 
equipment with a lower in i t i a l  cash outlay and pays an im p lic it  rate  
below normal in terest rates. The residual values achieved and placed on 
the a i r c r a f t  by the leasing companies have reduced the im p lic it  rates to 
the c a rr ie r .  Leasing, however, is not without i t s '  drawbacks.
One of the ch ie f drawbacks to the leasing arrangement involves the
period of time to which the regional c a rr ie r  is committed. Upon 
execution of the lease agreement, the c a rr ie r  is obligated through the 
term specified in the agreement. For example, i f  the c a rr ie r  signs a 
f iv e  year agreement, the a i r l in e  is required to make f iv e  years of lease 
payments even i f  i t  has no fu rth e r use fo r the a i r c r a f t  a f te r  3 years. 
Further, the c a rr ie r  is not allowed to dispose of the a irc ra f t  because
i t  is  not the owner. I f  the c a rr ie r  returns the equipment to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
leasing company two years e a r ly ,  the c a rr ie r  would s t i l l  be responsible 
fo r  payment over the remaining two years. There are however, some 
options ava ilab le . For instance, the c a rr ie r  may be able to negotiate 
new terms with the leasing company to return the a irc ra f t  or sublease 
the a i r c r a f t  to a th ird  party.
Lease agreements w il l  generally permit the c a rr ie r  to sub-lease the 
a ir c r a f t  to a th ird  party with the permission of the leasing company. 
The c a r r ie r  may be able to place the a i r c r a f t  at a higher monthly rate  
and can therefore , achieve a return fo r i ts  trouble. I f  the c a rr ie r  is 
unable to locate such a sub-lessee or market conditions d ic tate  
otherwise, the c a rr ie r  may have to subsidize the sub-lessee's ra te .  
This would probably s t i l l  be preferred to the a lte rnative  of not 
generating any income at a l l .
As previously mentioned, the a ir c r a f t  is the property of the 
leasing company throughout the term of the lease. I f  the c a rr ie r  has a 
need fo r the a i r c r a f t  a f te r  the expiration of the lease, the leasing 
company is under no obligation to extend i t .  I t  has been recent 
experience that new terms are negotiated perhaps to the c a rr ie r 's  
disadvantage depending on the market fo r used equipment and in terest  
rates at the time. Some a i r c r a f t  command higher values than when sold 
new. This phenomenon is re flected  in Exhibit E -  Resale Values. Hence, 
residual value r isk  can work fo r or against the c a rr ie r .
Leveraged Lease
Tax orientated leasing offers  two types of structure: the "single
investor" lease and the "leveraged" lease. The leveraged lease has 
become extremely popular with the regional operators because i t  offers
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the regional c a r r ie r  lower lease payments than would occur under a 
single investor lease. Although the costs to establish the leveraged 
lease are s ig n if ic a n t ,  these costs are usually ju s t i f ie d  by the high 
cost o f the a i r c r a f t .  The high cost to establish a leveraged 
transaction are due to the number of parties involved and the additional 
legal expenses when more parties are involved. They include the lessee, 
the equity p a rtic ip an t, a long-term debt lender and the owner trustee. 
The single investor lease involves only the lessee and lessor.
Under the leveraged lease arrangement, the investor w il l  put up the 
equity portion representing 20 to 50 percent of the equipment cost and 
w il l  then borrow the balance at commercial ra tes , usually through an 
owner trustee. For tax purposes, the equity partic ipant is required to 
contribute a t least 20 percent of the equipment's cost in order to be 
considered "at risk" by the 1RS. This is contrary to the single 
investor lease in which the single investor provides both the debt and 
equity portion of the equipment cost from i ts  own funds. Hence, the 
leveraged investor has a much smaller investment when compared to the 
single investor.
The debt portion of the leveraged lease is funded by a long-term 
lender on a non-recourse basis to the equity investor. The lender looks 
to the c a rr ie r  for repayment and the in te rest rate charged by the lender 
is based on the c red it  strength of the c a rr ie r .  The lender f i le s  a 
f i r s t  l ie n  on the a i r c r a f t  and receives an assignment of the lease 
payments. In the event of d e fa u lt ,  the lender must look to the value of 
the a i r c r a f t  and to the c a rr ie r  fo r repayment and not to the equity  
p artic ip an t ( in v es to r).
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The "leverage" is created because the equity partic ipant claims the 
to ta l tax benefits availab le  on the fu l l  purchase price of the a ir c ra f t  
without having to invest the f u l l  purchase amount. In e f fe c t ,  the tax 
benefits are magnified because the debt is non-recourse to the equity 
partic ip an t. The equity p artic ip an t's  return is based upon three items 
-  the tax benefits availab le  from ownership of the a i r c r a f t ,  the amount 
of lease payments received from the c a rr ie r  which are in excess of the 
debt service payments and the residual value of the a ir c ra f t  at the 
termination of the lease term. Hence, the partic ipant receives the 
benefits of ownership on the en tire  equipment cost while investing only 
a re la t iv e ly  small portion of the acquisition cost. Thus, the leveraged 
lease enables the sheltering of a maximum amount of taxable income with 
a minimum investment. A fu rther advantage of the leveraged lease is 
that with a small equity investment requirement per lease, the investor 
can spread risk  over a broader range of lessees and equipment.
The investors return is calculated on the actual amount of funds 
invested, that is ,  the equity portion. Hence, the investor is able to 
pass on a favorable package to the c a rr ie r  since the overall return
required is less than that required by the single investor lease
arrangement. For the c a rr ie r  interested in the lowest monthly lease 
cost, the leveraged lease works very w ell.
The equity partic ipan t or investor referenced above is more
commonly a group of individual investors headed by an independent
management team or trustee. The individuals who comprise the group 
spread th e ir  risk  among a l l  the investors and th e ir  return is 
proportionate to th e ir  individual investment.
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The primary disadvantage of the leveraged lease centers around 
timing. F ir s t ,  the leverage lease requires more time to package. With 
the number o f investors involved and the re la t iv e  complexities o f the
leveraged lease, i t  w i l l  often take a considerable amount of time to
arrange fo r  a l l  of the investors to gather and commit to a transaction. 
Another timing problem surfaces at year-end. Since this lease is tax 
motivated and most investors have taxable year-end in December, many of 
the investors are not able to determine tax l i a b i l i t i e s  until that time. 
Therefore, the investor is usually unable to commit until la te  in the 
year. Unfortunately, the regional c a rr ie r  must generally plan the 
purchase of the a i r c r a f t  months in advance of delivery. Hence, a timing 
problem resu lts . Herein l ie s  i ts  ch ief disadvantage.
Public Financing
The majority of regional a ir l in e s  are p riva te ly  held companies, 
several of which are family owned. Many of these owners have re lied  on 
th e ir  local bank to meet the financia l needs of th e ir  a ir l in e s .  However, 
as equipment and operational costs rose, i t  became more d i f f i c u l t  for  
the local banks to f u l f i l l  the capita l requirements which were necessary 
to support the c a rr ie r 's  operation. To handle the capital requirements, 
some regional carriers  considered the aspects of going public.
This has become a popular way of raising capital fo r regional
a ir l in e s .  Prior to 1981, only 2 regional carriers were public ly held. 
As of year end 1984, there were 22 regional carriers which were public 
companies. Between October 1981 and June 1983, regional carriers raised 
in excess of $58 m illio n  in the public equity market.^
The trend to going public can be a ttr ibu ted  to the rapidly
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increasing capital requirements, a declining supply of private and 
venture capita l funds which are in part the resu lt of the Deregulation 
Act. In order to take advantage of the opportunities and markets which 
were created as a resu lt of the Act, the regional carriers had to 
expand. This necessitated the acquisition of additional a i r c ra f t  and 
f a c i l i t i e s  to support the c a rr ie r 's  new operation. Since most carriers  
had a lim ited equity base and the c a rr ie r 's  debt to equity ra t io  was 
high, the carriers  sought to build th e ir  equity base. This in turn, 
necessitated public o fferings.
In addition to the capital raised through equity partic ipants, one 
of the advantages of going public according to Donald Santacroce, 
President of NewAir (a Connecticut reg iona l), is the increased awareness 
of the business community.^ Until very recently the regional a i r l in e  
industry had been re la t iv e ly  unknown.
One of the disadvantages of going public is some loss of control 
the former owners/managers enjoyed. In a survey conducted by Fairchild  
A irc ra f t  Corporation, th is factor was l is te d  by these former owners as 
one of the main drawbacks to going public , and certa in ly  the biggest
9
adjustment they had to make personally. For years, these 
owner/managers had controlled every aspect of the business and financial 
data were proprietary. A fter going public , disclosure of a l l  aspects of 
the operations including financia l information on the company and 
themselves was required. In addition, they must now answer to 
shareholders.
Manufacture Support
As previously mentioned, many of the regional a i r  carriers are
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under-capitalized and do not have the c red it  history to support the 
purchase of an a i r c r a f t  costing several m illio n  do lla rs . In an e f fo r t  
to increase sales and partly  out of competitive necessity, manufacturers 
created th e ir  own in-house finance companies commonly referred to as 
captive finance companies (CFC).
Manufacturer-backed finance programs have come to play a c r i t ic a l  
role in the funding of a i r c r a f t .  Manufacturers become involved due to 
the c a r r ie r 's  in a b i l i t y  or unwillingness to tap trad itiona l financial 
markets and the c a r r ie r 's  desire fo r financial f l e x ib i l i t y .  Oftentimes, 
the manufacturer substitutes i ts  c red it  in lieu  of the regional 
c a r r ie r 's  and then se lls  the package to another financia l in s t itu t io n .  
The manufacturer then sub-leases the a i r c ra f t  to the c a rr ie r .  The 
c a rr ie r  receives the benefits of the manufacturers cred it in the form of 
lower payments and the th ird  party finance company looks to the 
manufacturer in the event of defau lt.
Manufacturer supported transactions o ffe r  three advantages to the 
regional c a r r ie r .  F ir s t ,  the burden of placing the transaction may be 
borne by the manufacturer or a th ird  party. The ca rr ie r  does not have 
to spend management time searching the financia l market. Secondly, 
manufacturers w il l  sometimes allow the c a rr ie r  the option to cancel the 
lease during i ts  term. Usually th is is a one-time option but i t  o ffers  
the c a r r ie r  some additional f l e x i b i l i t y .  F in a lly ,  in the event of 
cancellation or a s h o rt - fa l l  in the equipment's re -sa le  value, the loss 
may be sustained by the manufacturer.
Captive finance companies are used in a varie ty  of ways by the 
manufacturer but they perform the same function as any other financia l
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in s t i tu t io n ,  th a t i s ,  obtain c red it  information, review financial 
statements and prepare documents. The obvious difference between the 
captive finance company and the independent finance company is that the 
manufacturer-backed company has a vested in terest in both the financing 
and in the sale of the a i r c r a f t .
The approach taken by the captive finance company as fa r  as cred it  
c r i te r ia  and p r o f i t a b i l i t y  is concerned is the same as i t  would be for  
any finance company, a t least i n i t i a l l y .  Id e a lly ,  the captive finance 
company, as any other financia l in s t itu t io n  wishes to obtain the best 
return possible at reasonable r is k .  In commuter a ir c ra f t  financing, as 
in  any new industry, r isk  tends to be high.
A f in a n c ia l ly  sound regional c a rr ie r  with a good cred it history can 
generally obtain as good or better terms than that offered by the 
captive finance company. I f  the regional a i r l in e  is in th is position, 
the CFC is but one of many in s titu t io n s  bidding on the transaction. 
However, the real value of the CFC is realized when the manufacturer is 
involved in the financing of a marginal c red it risk and/or when 
competing with other a ir c r a f t  manufacturers.
In the case of a marginal c red it r is k ,  the CFC evaluates the cred it  
and ca re fu lly  analyzes the c a r r ie r 's  operation. The credit decision 
w il l  be based, to a large extent, upon the management and the 
anticipated future of the a i r l in e .  I f  the business plan, management and 
f inanc ia l condition of the a i r l in e  don't ju s t i fy  the acquisition, the 
CFC simply denies the application . However, i f  the CFC feels the 
a i r l in e  has a good future with growth p o te n t ia l ,  the CFC usually 
approves the transaction.
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The value of an in-house finance company is also realized when the 
manufacturer is bidding against other manufacturers. To win a bid, i t  
often takes concessions from both the manufacturer and the CFC, The
concessions provided by the CFC can sometimes make the difference
between securing or losing the transaction. The CFC provides the 
manufacturer with an additional piece of weaponry which can spell the 
difference between success and fa i lu r e .
B. COMPETITION
Regional a ir l in e s  compete with two primary modes of transportation  
-  other a i r  carriers  and the automobile. I t  may be easy to understand 
how another a i r  c a rr ie r  could be a competing factor but perhaps not so
easy to understand how the automobile competes with the regional
a i r l in e .  However, the automobile not only competes but i t  is the 
regional a ir l in e s  primary competitor. To understand the reasons behind 
th is ,  one must understand the basis on which the regional c a rr ie r 's  
route structure operates.
Regional a i r  carrie rs  were created to serve the transportation  
needs of smaller communities, thus, they generally operate in a 100 to 
300 mile radius. Because of the re la t iv e ly  short distances involved, 
the regional carrie rs  are forced to compete with the automobile. The 
primary factors affecting  the passenger's decision to f l y  or drive  
center around cost, convenience and time. Whether the passenger is 
connecting to another f l ig h t  at a hub a irp o rt  or traveling on one leg 
only of the regional's  f l i g h t ,  the c a rr ie r  must be able to compete 
within these three decision c r i te r ia .
Automobile
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The average f l ig h t  length fo r a regional c a rr ie r  is only 160 miles. 
The automobile may be able to travel th is  distance in 3 hours. In order 
fo r  the regional c a rr ie r  to be competitive on a time basis, i t  must be 
able to complete th is  mission in less time than i t  takes the passenger 
to d rive . Based on a 300 mph a i r c r a f t ,  a 160 mile t r ip  takes 
approximately 1/2 hour of f l ig h t  time. This does not include the amount 
of time to taxi to and from the terminal or the time and inconvenience 
the passenger must endure to park h is /her car, check-in then out, and 
perhaps rent a car a t the new location. In addition, the cost of a i r  
transportation w il l  more often than not, be higher than what i t  w il l  
cost the passenger to drive his or her automobile.
A ll things considered i t  may be more convenient and less expensive 
fo r the passenger to travel in his /her automobile than to travel on a 
regional a i r l in e .  In some cases i t  may also be more convenient for the 
passenger to drive to the hub a irpo rt and board the major's f l ig h t  
d ire c t ly  rather than to ride on the regional c a rr ie r 's  f l ig h t .  In doing 
so, the passenger w il l  not have to worry about baggage being misplaced, 
or missing the connecting f l ig h t  due to a delay on the part of the 
regional a i r l in e .  The passenger must also consider the disadvantage of 
t r a f f ic  delays associated with the automobile when evaluating the 
a lte rn a tive s .
The regional carr ie rs  must also compete with another form of ground 
transportation -  the bus or limousine service. This is p art ic u la r ly  
true where major airports  and/or major population centers are within  
reasonable driving distances from one another. According to Joe Fugere, 
president of P ilgrim  A ir l in e s ,  P ilgrim 's main competition comes from the
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In te r -s ta te  limousine services transporting passengers to and from the 
New York area a i r p o r t s . T h e  services provided by these limousines 
extend as fa r  as 150 miles. To counteract the competition. Pilgrim  
offers  the same service fo r a $20 add-on charge fo r those passengers 
continuing onto another Pilgrim or inter-connecting f l ig h t .  Hence, the 
regional carriers  are competing heavily not only with the automobile but 
also with other modes of ground transportation fo r the short-haul 
business.
Other A ir  Carriers
The Deregulation Act opened the doors of competition by allowing 
the a i r  carriers to fre e ly  enter and e x it  markets at th e ir  own 
discretion. In doing so, these carriers ins titu ted  strategies which in 
some cases led to head-to-head competition. Prior to this time, the 
a ir l in e s  co-existed in a re la t iv e ly  non-competitive environment.
The development of the regional a i r l in e  was also influenced by the 
d irec t and ind irect action of the CAB and major a ir l in e s .  The design and 
purpose of regional a ir l in e s  were to serve the smaller communities and 
act as "feeders" to the majors. They did so by transporting passengers 
to larger airports most often to connect with another major a ir l in e  
f l ig h t .  Therefore, the major carr ie rs  had an in te res t in preserving a 
smooth, integrated system insuring easy passenger connections. Hence, 
the regional carr ie rs  were protected by both the CAB and the major 
c a rr ie rs .
History of Protection
Like the major c a rr ie rs ,  p rio r to deregulation the regional 
a ir l in e s  were protected to a large extent by CAB controls. Although the
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regional c a rr ie r  was not required to be a c e r t i f ic a te d  c a rr ie r ,  the CAB 
s t i l l  controlled the areas in which the regional operated. In order to 
operate in an area, the regional had to be registered with the CAB. The
CAB also regulated the regional c a r r ie r 's  subsidized a i r  service
programs. Hence, the CAB regulated the a c t iv i t ie s  of the carriers such
that i ts  e ffe c t  lim ited  competition and allowed a i r  fares to be set at
a r t i f i c i a l l y  high lev e ls . When the major carriers received approval to 
raise fa res , the regionals generally followed su it and they did so 
without public outcry since the majors had paved the way. The increase 
was ra tionalized  as an across-the-board rate hike. Like his bigger 
brother, the regional had no real competitive incentive to hold down its  
costs.
A s im ilar a tt itu d e  applied to route monopolies. The CAB protected 
the route structures of the major carriers while the regionals had a 
kind of unspoken route authority ( i f  fo r no other reason because there 
were so few regional carriers  in the early  years). Furthermore, CAB 
regulations made i t  a d i f f i c u l t  industry to simply "jump in to " . I f  an 
entrepreneur decided to s ta r t  an a i r l in e ,  had the capital available and 
received the necessary governmental approvals, there was no reason to 
compete d ire c t ly  with another c a rr ie r  since there were plenty of 
availab le  markets from which to choose.
Deregulation Act
Overnight, the Deregulation Act changed the industry but the 
carr ie rs  brought th e ir  high cost structures from the regulated period. 
Although the regional ca rr ie rs  did not have as high a cost structure as 
the major c a rr ie rs ,  due to lower equipment and labor costs, th e ir  cost
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structures were also high, at least higher than the new regional 
entrants with whom they now had to compete. Beyond production costs, 
the a b i l i t y  of a new or an established c a rr ie r  to enter markets at w il l  
created problems fo r the regional ca rr ie rs . The security enjoyed under 
the CAB was gone and was replaced by an in flux  of available seats in 
markets which h is to r ic a l ly  were monopolistic. The regional carriers  
soon found one or two carrie rs  serving the same markets they previously 
served alone.
Regional carr ie rs  also discovered that some of the majors which had 
previously abandoned routes were now returning to these same routes. 
With the advent of deregulation, carrie rs  pulled out of the short-haul, 
unprofitable routes to concentrate th e ir  equipment on the more lucrative  
routes. The regional carrie rs  were quick to begin service in these 
vacated short-haul routes. For a period of time th is worked well for  
both carr ie rs  as each f i l l e d  service voids. A fte r the market became 
saturated with c a rr ie rs ,  heavy competition ensued. The major carriers  
discovered the need for th e ir  own feed t r a f f i c  in order to f i l l  th e ir  
f l ig h ts .  In those cases which the major began to feed i t s e l f ,  the 
regional c a rr ie r 's  tra d it io n a l ro le  was pre-empted since they could 
neither compete with the convenience of a "d irect connection" or 
p ro fita b ly  match the low fares which were subsidized by the major 
ca rr ie rs .
In an e f fo r t  to s ta b i l iz e  th e ir  position, many regional carriers  
sought to establish relationships with major c a rr ie rs . Likewise, the 
majors also sought to establish these relationships as they began to 
re a l iz e  the importance of the regional a i r l in e .  These relationships
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range from loosely organized attempts to coordinate schedules, to formal 
w ritten  agreements outlin ing the specifics of each c a rr ie r 's  
resp o n s ib ilit ies  to the other.
C. RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE MAJOR CARRIERS
The re lationship  between the regional a i r l in e  and the major a ir l in e  
has changed dramatically since the I9 6 0 's. Part of th is change can be 
attr ib u ted  to the Deregulation Act of 1978 and part to the regional 
a ir l in e s  phenomenally fas t growth. As stated above, regional carriers  
provide v ir tu a l ly  a l l  of the small community a ir  service and as such,
more attention has been paid to the regionals by the major carr ie rs .
During the days of regulation, the major carriers enjoyed 
monopolistic routes and schedules. The regional carriers  provided a ir  
service to the major's hub which enabled passengers to connect and
continue on th e ir  journey on-board the major c a rr ie r 's  a i r c r a f t .  Both
the regional a i r l in e  and passengers schedule revolved around the major 
c a rr ie r 's  route structure and schedule. C learly , the major ca rr ie r  was 
in the d r ive r 's  seat. Kingsley G. Morse, president of Command Airways, 
I n c . , re c a l ls ,
"In the beginning i t  was almost impossible to even 
develop a basic re lationship with an a i r  c a rr ie r .
I can reca ll  that i t  took almost three years to 
convince an a ir  carrieç to give us a jo in t  fare.
Now they are common."
With the enactment of the Deregulation Act, the major carriers were 
forced to abandon th e ir  unprofitable short-haul routes and concentrate 
th e ir  assets on the p ro fitab le  long-haul f l ig h ts .  As these carriers  
dropped service in the short-haul markets, they realized that th e ir  load 
factors begin to drop. In response, the majors quickly adapted one of
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two s tra teg ies . One strategy was to re instate  service into the short- 
haul markets and begin feeding themselves. Under this scenario, the 
major was again subsidizing the short-haul routes. The other strategy 
was to develop a re lationship  with a regional a i r l in e  and have the 
regional provide the "feeder" service to the major. Today this  
arrangement is commonly referred to as " in te r l in in g " .
Obviously, not a l l  the majors handled the regional a ir lin es  in the 
same manner e ith er  before or a f te r  the Deregulation Act. Prior to the 
Act, several major carriers recognized the importance of the regional 
c a rr ie r  and the services which they provided. One such c a rr ie r  was 
Allegheny A ir l in e s .
The Birth of the In te r l in e  Relationship
In the la te  1960's the then president of Allegheny A ir l in e s ,  Les 
Barnes, developed a concept which would change the way his a ir l in e  would 
operate. At that time, major c a rr ie rs ,  l ik e  Allegheny, were responsible 
fo r  providing service to communities which the CAB so designated 
regardless of whether i t  was a p ro fitab le  route or not. Hence, 
Allegheny could not drop the market as they could do today.
With th is  in mind, Mr. Barnes developed a plan to re lieve Allegheny 
of i ts  unprofitable short-haul routes. The plan allowed Allegheny to  
serve these markets without loss of revenue, without the added burden of 
acquiring additional equipment and without a cash outlay. Mr. Barnes 
concept u t i l iz e d  the smaller a i r l in e  to compliment his f le e t  by bringing 
passengers from these short-haul markets. The feeder would be under the 
control and would wear the colors of Allegheny A ir lin e s . The new 
a i r l in e  would be appropriately named the Allegheny Commuter. I t  is
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important to note that the CAB s t i l l  charged Allegheny with the
respo n s ib ility  of providing service to these smaller communities. I t  is
apparent that Mr. Barnes had an early appreciation fo r the regional
a i r l in e  and what the regional a i r l in e  could do for a major c a rr ie r .
In 1967, Allegheny Commuter commenced operations with an agreement
between Allegheny A irl ines  and a small regional ca rr ie r  called Henson
A ir l in e s . With CAB approval, the f i r s t  in te r l in e  arrangement between a
major c a rr ie r  and a commuter a ir l in e  began. Since this time, Allegheny
has changed i ts  name to USAir and Henson is no longer associated with
the organization but the in te r l in e  system of USAir s t i l l  ex ists . Last
year, regional carriers  serving USAir contributed 2,137,032 passengers
12or 13 percent of USAir's to ta l passenger load.
The Logic of In te r l in in g
Everyone benefits from th is type of arrangement. The major carr ie r  
benefits because i t  is able to drop some of i ts  unprofitable routes. I t  
also allows the major to transfer a i r c ra f t  being used in the short-haul 
markets to the la rg e r, more p ro fitab le  markets. Further, i t  gives the 
major the feed t r a f f i c  i t  needs. Hence, i t  has a t r ip le  e ffec t on the 
major.
The regional a i r l in e  also benefits s ig n if ica n tly  from this  
re la tionsh ip . The major c a r r ie r 's  name generally has wide-spread 
recognition in the markets in which i t  serves and therefore, the 
regional a i r l in e  is immediately recognized, a t least by name. 
Partic ipation  in the in te r l in e  program helps the regional with i ts  
lenders as w ell. The re lationship  can sometimes add c re d ib i l i ty  to the 
regional c a r r ie r 's  operation through association with a well known major
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c a r r ie r .  The regional also receives an immediate increase in passenger 
t r a f f i c  which i t  previously did not have. This of course, would have a 
positive e f fe c t  on the commuters financial statements.
The communities which receive the service from the in te r l in e  
connection benefit since the regional c a rr ie r  maybe able to provide 
better service than the major c a rr ie r .  The reason for this is that the 
regional c a rr ie r  can provide more frequent service to the community than 
that which could be provided by a major c a rr ie r  operating larger 
equipment. The regional c a rr ie r  is able to provide more frequent 
service because of i ts  lower a i r c r a f t  operating cost. Hence, the net 
e ffe c t  is more f l ig h ts  per day with no increase in a ir  fares. In fa c t ,  
the a i r  fares are often less because jo in t ly ,  the carriers are able to 
shuttle passenger t r a f f i c  more e f f ic ie n t ly .
One of the greatest benefits to the trave le r is a one t ic k e t  
purchase and single baggage claim. The tra ve le r can buy one t ic k e t ,  
check his or her baggage and then not have to worry about purchasing 
another t ic k e t  or having to re-check baggage. This is important 
consideration to the regional passenger since 70 percent continue on to 
another f l ig h t .
Regional A ir l ines  Recognized
The major carr ie rs  have taken notice of the growth which the 
regional a ir l in e s  have recently experienced and appear to be recognizing 
the important role that these carr ie rs  play in the a i r  transportation  
system. Further, these major carriers  re a lize  quickly that the regional 
a i r l in e  can have a very s ig n if ica n t e f fe c t  on the ir  financial 
statements. Today, major carr ie rs  are ac tive ly  s o lic it in g  regional
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a ir l in e s  to provide feeder service to th e ir  operations.
One of the more colorful figures in the a i r l in e  industry today is 
Frank Lorenzo, President and Chief Executive O fficer of Continental 
A ir l in e s . Mr. Lorenzo recognizes the importance of the regional feed 
t r a f f i c  s ta ting ,
"The name of today's game is the same as 
yesterday's old one —  feed. Large carriers  
today, are more aggressive.in pursuit of 
feed than we used to be."
Mr. Lorenzo further recognized the important role the regional carr ie r
plays in the p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of the major c a rr ie r .  In a luncheon address
to the Regional A ir l in e  Association, Mr. Lorenzo to ld  the group:
"Your t r a f f ic  is more important to us now than 
ever before...Any large a ir l in e  that can pick 
up ju s t one additional passenger per departing 
f l ig h t  can e ffe c t  a material change in its  
economic resu lts , so you can expect to continue 
to be wooed by most of u s . . ."
In his address, Mr. Lorenzo predicted that the relationship between 
regional and major carriers  would continue to grow and that the major 
carriers  are recognizing the regional c a rr ie r 's  contribution:
"F irs t ,  there is no question that the growing 
partnerships between small and large carriers  
are providing the trave ling  public with more 
and better services;
Secondly, i t  is abundantly c lear that the 
smaller a ir l in e s  have a v i ta l  and pro fitab le  
ro le in today's marketplace and are more 
important today to larger carrie rs  than they 
ever were."
D. MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
Two of the more recent problems effecting  the regional a i r l in e  
industry which w il l  be discussed below, are the "tw o-letter designator" 
and the "Computer Reservation System (CRS)". The CRS has the potential
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of costing the regional a i r l in e  industry several m illion  dollars  
annually in passenger booking fees. Hence, the reason fo r i ts  
atten tio n . The tw o -le tte r  designator issue, which has evolved from the 
in te r l in e  arrangement between the regional and major c a rr ie r ,  is 
dividing the industry. The carr ie rs  who have entered into an in te r l in e  
agreement are generally in favor of the tw o -le tte r  system while those 
carr ie rs  not in te rlin ed  are generally opposed.
Two-Letter Designator
Two-letter designators were developed out of the necessity to 
abbreviate e lectronic messages transmitted on teletype c ircu its  in the 
early days of a i r l in e  transportation. The tw o -le tte r  code simply 
id e n t if ie d  the c a rr ie r  and allowed the sender of the teletype to reduce 
the amount of time to send the message. Today, these codes are used in 
a l l  of the travel guides including the most popular, the O ff ic ia l  
A ir l in e  Guide (GAG). Travel agencies around the world also use the two- 
l e t t e r  designator to id e n tify  the carriers on which th e ir  customers w il l  
be trave lin g . These same codes can be found on every t ic k e t  purchased 
and on the various automated reservation systems used in the a ir  travel 
industry.
The regional c a rr ie r  who is in te rlin e d  with a major adopts the two- 
l e t t e r  designator of the major c a r r ie r .  In the GAG and in the 
computerized reservation systems, the regional c a rr ie r 's  f l ig h t  w il l  be 
shown as one of the major a i r l in e 's  f l ig h ts .  The regional c a rr ie r  also 
retains the tw o -le tte r  code which i t  was o r ig in a lly  assigned.
Double L istings
Having two separate designators has allowed the regional c a rr ie r
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the opportunity to l i s t  i t s e l f  twice in the OAG and in the computer 
reservation system. The regional c a rr ie r  l is ts  i t s e l f  under the major's 
tw o -le tte r  designator and again under i ts  own tw o -le tte r  designator. 
This obviously provides a marketing advantage to both the major and 
regional c a r r ie r .  However, th is may be misleading to both travel agents 
and passengers a l ik e .  In using these guides, the travel agent or 
passenger may believe they w il l  be boarding the major c a r r ie r ’ s
a i r c r a f t .  I f  the c a rr ie r  has a f le e t  of j e t  a i r c r a f t ,  one could
reasonably expect to be boarding a je t  a i r c ra f t .
American A ir lin es  is one c a rr ie r  which has charged that the two- 
le t t e r  designators are being misused and has f i le d  a lawsuit against 
Eastern, Frontier and Pan American A ir l in e s , The su it alleges that 
these carriers are misleading the traveling public. The crux of the 
lawsuit centers around the tactics used by the carriers in allegedly  
misleading the passengers into believing they w il l  be boarding the major
c a rr ie r 's  j e t  a i r c r a f t  when in fa c t ,  they w il l  be boarding the regional
c a r r ie r 's  much smaller a i r c r a f t .
Passenger Response
A1 Kolakowski, Delta A ir l in e s ' manager of marketing services, is 
not convinced the customer re a l ly  c a r e s . F r o m  D elta ’ s experience there 
have been complaints but overall the travelers are accepting the 
practice. According to Mr. Kolakowski, there is better acceptance in 
the smaller communities than out of a major hub a irp o rt .  This would be 
expected as most of the smaller communities are already receiving  
service from the regional carrie rs  and are therefore, accustomed to the 
regional c a r r ie r 's  a i r c r a f t .
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John Van Arsdale, former chairman and CEO of Provincetown-Boston 
A ir l in e ,  the nation's largest regional c a rr ie r ,  feels the tw o-le tte r  
designator is misleading and the passengers do care. Mr. Van Arsdale 
stated the practice of using the major's code "is re a lly  wrong" and 
" re a lly  deceptive.
Issues
The 2 le t t e r  designator issue is s p l i t t in g  the regional industry. 
Some of the regional c a rr ie rs ,  most often those which have interlined  
with a major c a r r ie r ,  are in favor of u t i l iz in g  the major's 2 le t te r  
designator. Others are against the program. The independent regional 
carriers  which are not associated with a major ca rr ie r  are generally 
opposed to the 2 le t te r  designator. They believe they are placed at a 
disadvantage due to name recognition which some of th e ir  competitors 
enjoy with a major c a rr ie r  and the additional advantage of double 
l is t in g  in the reservation system.
The significance of in te r l in in g  may have more far-reaching
im plications. In those areas where a major c a rr ie r  moves a dedicated
regional on top of another regional c a rr ie r  already serving that market,
the la t t e r  may su ffe r . Kingsley Morse, president of Command Airways,
fears the regional c a rr ie r  could be caught in the middle of a battle
between the majors with devastating re su lts , "these excursions could be
suicide missions."^® Bob Shults, CEO of Scheduled Skyways, concurs " i f
some of our cohorts are coerced into being the pointman in the
1 Q
bloodbath, i t  w il l  be re a l ly  bad."
The independent regional c a rr ie r  w il l  have d i f f ic u l ty  in locations 
where a major develops a dedicated feeder. The major ca rr ie r  is able to
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leverage the independent regional c a rr ie r  by refusing to in te r l in e .  
This w i l l  cause the passenger to e ith er  purchase two separate tickets on 
the independent or one t ic k e t  with a single check-in on the interlined  
regional. The end results are increased fares , and baggage and t ic k e t  
inconvenience to the passenger not traveling on the in terlined  regional. 
I t  w i l l  be several years before the impact of in te r l in in g  is known.
Kingsley Morse views the in te r l in e  arrangement as "the end of the
20independent operator" and predicts that "the configuration of the
industry w i l l  be made up of constellations of major a ir l in e s ,  commuters
21and travel agents." To date, over 40 regional carriers have formed 
in te r l in e  relationships with 12 major a ir l in e s  and this trend is 
expected to continue.
Computer Reservation System (CRS)
One of the more recent developments which could have a s ignificant  
impact on the regional c a rr ie r  is the Computer Reservation System (CRS). 
Like the in te r l in e  re lationsh ip , the CRS rule w il l  give a competitive 
advantage to the regional c a rr ie r  in terlined  with a major c a rr ie r  which 
owns and operates a CRS system.
The CRS system is a reservation system whereby a l l  passenger 
bookings are made through one central reservation system. The major 
carriers  which currently  own and operate these systems (American, 
United, TWA, Eastern and Delta) are at a competitive advantage. The 
regional and other carrie rs  not owning such a system w il l  have to pay 
fo r  the use of the reservation system since a l l  of th e ir  bookings w il l  
be made through the CRS system. The rule is bias towards the owners of 
CRS systems since i t  allows them to l i s t  th e ir  f l ig h ts  and those of
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th e ir  in te r l in e d  regional ahead of other carr ie rs . The system 
incorporates booking fees and automatic penalties for non on-line  
connections.
I t  is  estimated that i t  w i l l  cost the regional carriers
22approximately $38 m illio n  annually in booking fees alone. This 
supports the notion that a in te r l in e  relationship may be necessary for  
the survival of the regional c a rr ie r .
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IV. STRATEGIES OF REGIONAL AIRLINES
The strategies of the regional carriers  are discussed in this  
section in both the regulated and deregulated environments. The 
strategies of the regional c a rr ie r  under regulation was re la t iv e ly  
stra ight forward while the strategies of the regional c a rr ie r  today, 
under deregulation, is much d if fe re n t .  Included in this section w il l  be 
the history and strategies of two well-respected regional carrie rs .
A. STRATEGIES UNDER REGULATIONS
As mentioned, the route development strategies of the regional 
c a rr ie r  during regulation were re la t iv e ly  stra ight forward. Service was 
provided to smaller communities not receiving any a i r  transportation and 
replacement service was provided to those communities from which a major 
c a rr ie r  withdrew. The regional carriers were better able to serve these 
communities since they could provide more frequent and economical 
service.
The regional c a r r ie r 's  expansion was more often the result of a 
major c a rr ie r  dropping service to a community than the regional carriers  
planned expansion into these markets. However, prior to withdrawing 
service from any route, the major c a rr ie r  had to obtain CAB approval in 
the regulated environment. The location of the regional c a rr ie r  
played a s ig n if ica n t role in i ts  development. Being located in or near 
the communities which were abandoned by a major ca rr ie r  put the "local"  
regional c a rr ie r  in an advantageous position. This fa c i l i ta te d  the 
early  route development of many of these "local" regional carr ie rs .
During th is period, certa in  areas of the country provided the
regional c a r r ie r  better expansion opportunities than others. Areas of
71
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the nation where several smaller communities were located in close 
proximity to one another and/or located close to a hub a irp o rt ,  made i t  
easier fo r  a major serving that area to obtain CAB approval to drop 
service, than in those areas where distances between communities was 
longer and a lte rn a tive  transportation less availab le . The regional 
a ir l in e  was afforded more opportunity to f i l l  the void and quickly 
gained presence in the Northeast, Midwest and in California but less 
quickly in the Mountainous and Southeastern states.
The regional carriers  route strategies were somewhat lim ited by the 
type of a i r c r a f t  which these carriers  were allowed to operate. Prior to 
1984, regional carrie rs  did not have an a ir c ra f t  which was spec ifica lly  
designed to serve th e ir  needs. As a re s u lt ,  the regional ca rr ie r  had to 
u t i l i z e  a ir c r a f t  which, by design, lim ited the c a rr ie r 's  cap ab ilit ies .  
The c a rr ie r  was fu rther lim ited by regulation, as to the size and range 
of the a i r c r a f t  they were allowed to operate. For example, two popular 
a ir c r a f t  used by regional carrie rs  at that time were the Beech 99 and 
the Twin O tter. With a fu l l  load of 19 passengers, the Twin Otter was 
e ffe c t iv e ly  lim ited to markets of 125 miles or less due to the CAB's 
Part 298 12,500 pound weight re s tr ic t io n  and fuel trade-o ff
l im ita tio n s .^  With a f u l l  load, the 15 passenger Beech 99 was likewise 
lim ited  to markets of less than 150 miles.^ Hence, the regional ca rr ie r  
was lim ited  by the a i r c r a f t  i t  operated which in turn lim ited the 
c a rr ie r 's  a b i l i t y  to c a p ita l ize  on market opportunities.
I ro n ic a l ly ,  the type of equipment the major carriers were operating 
also helped the development of regional a ir l in e s .  The operating 
economics of j e t  a i r c r a f t  required a high load factor fo r p ro fitab le
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
operation. As the price of j e t  fuel rose and load factors grew slowly, 
the major ca rr ie rs  realized they would not be able to continue the 
short-haul, low density routes p ro fitab ly  with j e t  a i r c ra f t .  In a 
regulated environment, the major c a rr ie r  operating such a ir c ra f t  were 
able to subsidize the low density routes by e ith er "feeding" these 
passengers to i t s '  long-haul p ro fitab le  f l ig h ts  or subsidize the low 
density route through a federal subsidy program. In e ither case, the 
major c a rr ie r  was dependent upon factors other than the route i t s e l f  to 
support the operation.
The Allegheny Commuter concept popularized the in te r l in e  idea in 
1967. The arrangement provided Allegheny (major) with the best of both 
worlds -  economical operation of the route and feed t r a f f ic .  The 
Allegheny commuters served the smaller communities which Allegheny 
(major) could not p ro fita b ly  serve with j e t  a i r c ra f t .  The commuters fed 
passengers to various Allegheny hubs to connect with the Allegheny je t  
f l ig h ts .  The Allegheny operation proved that i t  was more e f f ic ie n t  and 
p ro fita b le  to both carrie rs  to in te r l in e  than to operate the l ig h te r  
density routes independently. Hence, the overall strategy of these 
commuters was to a l ly  themselves with Allegheny and serve as i ts  feeder.
Another development which aided the regional carriers growth was 
the broadening of the a i r c r a f t  size l im ita t io n s . Prior to 1972, the 
regional carr ie rs  were lim ited  to 19 passenger a ir c ra f t  and only 3 years 
e a r l ie r ,  they were lim ited to 10 passengers. In 1972 the passenger seat 
l im ita t io n  was increased to 30 and again increased in 1978 to 60 seats 
with the enactment of the Deregulation Act. This allowed the regional 
c a rr ie r  to s tra te g ic a l ly  match any a i r c r a f t  with 60 passenger seats or
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less to a p a rt ic u la r  market. Prior to these events, the markets which 
were served by the regional c a rr ie r  had to adapt to the seating capacity 
of the regional c a r r ie r 's  a i r c r a f t .
Thus, in a regulated environment, the regional c a rr ie r 's  strategy  
revolved around the actions of the major ca rr ie rs . When a major c a rr ie r  
received approval to drop service in an area, a regional a ir l in e  
generally responded by providing replacement service. Another strategy 
used by several of the regional carriers was to align i t s e l f  with a 
major c a rr ie r  and provide feed t r a f f i c .
With the Deregulation Act, the opportunities for the regional 
c a rr ie r  expanded. Deregulation allowed both the regional and major 
c a rr ie r  to e x it  and enter markets at w i l l .  As the major's abandoned the 
low density routes, openings were created fo r  carriers operating smaller 
a i r c r a f t .  Therefore, the strategies employed by the regional carriers  
were likewise e ffected . Accordingly, the regional carriers had to adapt 
to new and oftentimes d iss im ilar strategies based on the circumstances 
which surrounded the c a rr ie r .
B. STRATEGIES UNDER DEREGULATION
One of the provisions of the Deregulation Act allowed both the 
major and regional c a rr ie r  to fre e ly  enter and e x it  markets. As major 
carrie rs  dropped out of the smaller, less dense markets, regional 
carr ie rs  quickly f i l l e d  the service void. The markets considered too 
th in fo r the majors were ideal fo r regional ca rr ie rs . In addition, with 
the a b i l i t y  to u t i l i z e  larger a i r c r a f t ,  the regional carriers were able 
to very e f f ic ie n t ly  match a i r c r a f t  to th e ir  markets.
The Linear and the Hub/Spoke Route Strategies
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The regional carriers  began to rearrange th e ir  routes to seek the 
optimal route structure and match the best a i r c ra f t  to the market
served. Two route structures are common -  the linear route structure
and the hub and spoke structure. Each links small communities with hub 
airports  and fa c i l i t a te s  connections with major carriers at the hub.
The hub and spoke structure uses the hub a irport and feeds i t  with
d ire c t ,  non-stop f l ig h ts  into  and out of that a irp o rt. The f l ig h t  
segments in and out of the "hub" a irpo rt represent the spokes of the hub 
and hence, the name "hub and spoke".
The lin ea r route structure also serves the hub airport but with 
longer f l ig h t  segments consisting of many leg segments. The f l ig h ts  of 
the regional c a rr ie r  using a l in e a r route structure usually w il l  consist 
of more than one stop along the route before reaching the hub a irport.  
The lin e a r route c a rr ie r  serves many communities on each f l ig h t .
Today, the regional a i r l in e  industry is predominantly composed of 
the hub and spoke route systems. According to CAB records, the ra tio  of 
average passenger t r ip  length to average f l ig h t  stage length of the top 
50 regional ca rr ie rs , show that the majority of these carriers have hub
O
and spoke route systems. Some of the larger regional carriers have even 
developed th e ir  own hub and spoke systems. Carriers such as A ir  
Wisconsin, Henson A ir lin e s  and Empire are serving hub-to-hub markets 
which obtain t r a f f i c  support from th e ir  non hub-to-hub routes. In any 
case, the regional c a rr ie r  must f i r s t  determine which route strategy  
best s u it  the needs of the market the c a rr ie r  serves and then pursue 
that strategy.
There appears to be l i t t l e  re lationship  between the hub and spoke
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feeder route charac teris tic  and size of the a ir c ra f t  operated by the 
regional c a rr ie rs . As referenced in Section I I .  the composition of the 
regional f le e t  in terms of f le e t  s ize , f le e t  composition, t r a f f ic  and 
route characteris tics indicate d iv e rs ity  among the carrie rs . The f le e t  
composition of the regional industry show some of the carriers have 
pursued route strategies geared e n t ire ly  to larger sized a irc ra f t .  
Others have stayed with the tra d it io n a l 15 to 19 passenger a ir c ra f t  and 
corresponding suitable routes to support such a ir c ra f t .
Carriers which specialize in the 15 to 19 passenger class of
a ir c ra f t  often serve regions of the country with l ig h t  density markets 
and re la t iv e ly  long stage lengths. These markets are most often found 
in the Midwestern, Southwestern and Mountainous sections of the country. 
For example. A ir  Midwest, Pioneer A ir l in e s ,  Midstates A ir l in e s , Royale 
A irlines and Scheduled Skyways a l l  have f le e ts  of more than 10 a irc ra f t  
in the 15 to 19 passenger seat class of a i r c r a f t .  These carriers a l l  
operate in the Midwestern, Southwestern or Mountainous sections of the 
country and prim arily  operate a l in ea r route system.
There are several carrie rs  which have chosen to specialize in the 
15 to 19 passenger a i r c r a f t  more fo r  competitive reasons than
geographical reasons. Apollo, Sun A ire , Horizon and Wings West a l l
serve the C a lifo rn ia  market and must compete with carriers which u t i l i z e  
la rger, and sometimes j e t  a i r c r a f t .  To compete, these regional carriers  
provide high-frequency service, surrounding the larger c a rr ie r 's  f l ig h ts  
with many of th e ir  own f l ig h ts .  The smaller a i r c ra f t  allows these 
carr ie rs  to u t i l i z e  a frequency strategy which in turn, offers th e ir  
passengers the convenience of time through frequent f l ig h ts .  In markets
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which are not j e t  sensitive , th is  strategy works exceedingly w ell.
Small Package Express Service
A recent move on the part of the regional carriers which can have a 
s ig n if ic a n t e ffe c t  on the revenues, has been the addition of a small
package express service to i ts  operation.
To a large extent, the rapid growth of the deregulated small
package express business has been attr ibu ted  to and associated largely
with Federal Express. However, the fac t that the independent regional 
a ir l in e  is a major c a rr ie r  of small overnight packages is less well
known. Whereas Federal Express owns most a l l  of i ts  a i r c ra f t ,  couriers
such as Purolator Courier, Emery, Airborne and others use regional
carriers  under contract to transport th e ir  overnight packages. In these
cases, the regional c a rr ie r 's  strategy becomes that of the courier 
i t s e l f  and i ts  cargo business consists of expressing packages to the 
courier's  hub on-board the regional c a rr ie r 's  a i r c r a f t .  For example, a 
regional c a rr ie r  which has several f l ig h ts  in and out of a courier's hub 
is eas ily  able to add the courier's  express mail on-board its  a i rc ra f t .  
The c a rr ie r  and courier both benefit since the ca rr ie r  receives
additional revenue fo r the service provided and the courier does not
have to invest in additional a i r c r a f t .
The significance of the regional a ir l in e s '  involvement in the
transportation of overnight packages is reflected in the s ta t is t ic s  for  
1984, Regional carr ie rs  transported 324 m illion  pounds in revenue
fre ig h t ,  involved 18 dedicated regional carriers  fly ing  168 a ir c ra f t  a 
to ta l of 155 thousand f l ig h t  hours in the transportation of th is revenue 
f r e ig h t . *
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Strategy of In te r l in in g  with a Major Carrier
As mentioned above, in te r l in in g  has become increasingly popular 
with some of the regional c a rr ie rs .  The highly successful Allegheny 
Commuter system which was organized and developed in the regulation era 
has continued to operate successfully under deregulation. The 
coordinated regional/major c a rr ie r  route development strategy has 
recently spread to many other c a rr ie r  combinations and is expected to 
continue to be popular among both the regional and major carr ie rs .
The in te r l in e  arrangement provides the regional carr ie r  with an 
e ffec tive  competitive strategy fo r protecting market positions on 
existing routes. I t  also allows the regional c a rr ie r  to more easily  
enter new routes under the major's protection. In th is manner, the 
major provides feed t r a f f i c  which the regional would not have with a 
start-up operation. In those instances where the major c a rr ie r  has 
launched a fu l l  scale e f fo r t  to create a new hub in i ts  system, the 
market and growth opportunities of the associated regional c a rr ie r  are 
correspondingly expanded.
C. STRATEGIES OF TWO REGIONAL AIRLINES
Two regional a ir l in e s  which have gained recognition in the regional 
a ir l in e  industry are Horizon A ir Industries, In c . ,  of Seattle ,  
Washington and Chautauqua, In c . ,  of Jamestown, New York. The 
differences between the carr ie rs  are many. One carr ie r  was developed 
because of and is e n t ire ly  dependent on one in te r l in e  re lationship, the 
other was b u i l t  as an independent and has b u i l t  relationships with many 
c a rr ie rs ;  one is a pub lic ly  held company, the other is private ly  held; 
one commenced operations in a regulated environment and the other is the
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child  of the Deregulation Act. For these reasons, the strategies  
employed by these carr ie rs  are d if fe re n t  and therefore, w il l  make fo r a 
good comparison. The examples also are indicative of the d ivers ity
among the carriers  which make-up the regional a i r l in e  industry.
CHAUTAUQUA AIRLINES
Chautauqua A ir lines  was founded by Joel Hall in August, 1974 with 
service between Jamestown, New York and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. For 
over ten years Chautauqua has operated as one of the Allegheny Commuter 
a ir l in e s  having service agreements with the burgeoning and profitab le
USAir, formerly known as Allegheny A ir l in e s . In the beginning,
Chautauqua's centerpoint was to provide connecting services with USAir's 
f l ig h ts  out of the USAir Pittsburgh hub. During its  f i r s t  fu l l  year of 
operation, Chautauqua's passenger boardings exceeded 46,000 increasing 
to 80,000 by 1978.
Route Development
In 1979, a Florida operation commenced from Orlando to Vero Beach 
and Ocala. The Florida operation was created partly  in response to 
Eastern A irlines  withdrawal of service from these c it ie s  and in part to 
feed USAir's Florida hub in Orlando. Chautauqua also began serving the 
Bradford to Pittsburgh market in April of 1979.
As a resu lt of these additions, Chautauqua's t r a f f ic  increased from 
an average of 7,000 boardings per month in 1978 to approximately 12,000 
monthly boardings in 1979. The to ta l number of passengers enplaned by 
Chautauqua was 142,710 in 1979 and increased to 146,929 in 1980. In 
1981, USAir withdrew its  j e t  service from the Pittsburgh-Akron/Canton 
markets and awarded Chautauqua th is  route. For the f i r s t  two months of
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operation which began on June 2, the passengers enplaned increased to
19,000 passengers per month. However, the a i r  t r a f f ic  contro ller 's  
s tr ik e  on August 3, caused the t r a f f ic  levels to drop to 15,000 
passengers per month.
Chautauqua transported 186,288 passengers in 1983, ranking i t  as 
the 38th largest a i r l in e  in regional service. In  1984, Chautauqua's 
enplaned passengers increased 45 percent to 269,091 which ranked
c
Chautauqua as the 32nd largest regional c a rr ie r .  To achieve these 
gains, Chautauqua has re lie d  on sound management and its  relationship  
with USAir. As Chautauqua continued to prove i t s e l f  to USAir with good, 
re l ia b le  service, USAir provided the opportunity to Chautauqua to 
operate more routes.
In 1984, USAir again awarded Chautauqua with two additional routes 
from Pittsburgh to Hagerstown, MD on March 15 and from Pittsburgh to 
C h arlo ttes v il le ,  VA on May 1. With the development of th e ir  existing  
markets, Chautauqua is expected to grow at an average annual rate of 10 
to 20 percent.^ Today, Chautauqua's average stage length is 125 miles.^ 
Management
Mr. H a ll 's  operation is lean with 193 total employees of which 63 
are p i lo ts ,  50 mechanics, 60 g a te / t ic k e t / f l ig h t  attendants, 15 
administration personnel and only 5 key management o f f ic ia ls ,  including 
Hall and his w ife . Hall favors the idea of purchasing new equipment 
rather than used. The deta ils  of the company's financial position are 
private since the H a ll 's  own the a i r l in e .  Mr. Hall does not favor his 
company going public . H a ll ,  l ik e  other regional operators, is one who 
does not want to lose the management control over the operation:
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"The long-term management control problems 
associated with a public ly-held company 
more than outweigh the short-term benefits 
of using public money to purchase capital 
equipment."
The operation appears to be p ro fitab le  since the H a ll 's  have been 
successful in arranging recent financing on several a irc ra f t  which cost 
in excess of $2,0 m ill io n  each. Mr. Hall also favors the lease finance 
method to acquire new equipment since i t  allows the optimal trade-o ff  
between cost and f l e x i b i l i t y .  Chautauqua's f le e t  consists of 3 Beech 
9 9 's, 2 Shorts 330 's and 7 Metro I l l ' s .
In evaluating and contro lling  routes costs, Hall employs the 
management concept that each segment of the system must be s e l f -  
s u ff ic ie n t and generate i ts  own p ro f i t .  The revenue generated by each 
f l ig h t  is o ffs e t by both the d irec t operating costs and overhead costs 
which are added to determine p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  Mr. Hall states:
"In th is way, we are able to keep close 
surveillance of productivity . We can act 
rapid ly enough to correct imbalance and g 
to prevent costs from getting out of hand.
Mr. Hall applies th is  technique to the purchase decision involving new
a ir c r a f t  and credits this system to a large extent to Chautauqua's
financia l track record.
Approximately 90 percent of Chautauqua's passengers connect to other 
f l ig h ts  of which 65 percent connect d ire c t ly  to a USAir f l ig h t .  
C learly , Chautauqua's strategy is to continue to work in the Allegheny 
Commuter system by feeding USAir f l ig h ts .  According to H a ll,  Chautauqua 
must be able "to move up and adjust to t r a f f ic  opportunities, yet at the 
same time be prepared for unexpected economic reversals should they 
occur.
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One important s ta b il iz in g  force on his side is the Allegheny
Commuter a f f i l i a t io n  with USAir and USAir's capacity for building a 
nationwide network of routes that w il l  hold USAir and i ts  associate
operators in good stead should an economic pinch take place. This
resource, coupled with the substantial marketing and f l ig h t  service 
benefits of the agreement with USAir provide management f l e x ib i l i t y  not 
read ily  availab le to small independent carr ie rs . In addition,
Chautauqua is able to supplement i ts  revenue through the small package 
express service developed by USAir. The service, called PDQ, is 
coordinated by USAir and prorates a portion of the shipping fee to 
Chautauqua when the package is on-board one of Chautauqua's f l ig h ts .  
Currently, Chautauqua's revenue fre ig h t accounts fo r less than 1 percent 
of i ts  to ta l
Chautauqua's development w il l  be influenced to a large extent by 
USAir's development and success. As USAir expands its  route structure, 
so w il l  Chautauqua. Mr. H a ll 's  strategy therefore, w il l  be to remain 
f le x ib le  and be prepared to react to opportunities as they are 
presented.
"We have no grandiose plan to sweep the 
a ir l in e  world o f f  i ts  fe e t .  Our goal is 
to stick to our established markets and 
develop them to th e ir  fu l le s t  potentia l.
Once we have done that we w il l  then seek 
fu rther opportunities."
HORIZON AIRLINES
Horizon A ir Industries , Inc. was formed in la te  1981 with service 
to two c i t ie s  in eastern Washington. Today, Horizon serves 23 c it ie s  in 
the states of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, C alifo rn ia  and Utah. Horizon
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has grown to become the Pacific  Northwest's largest regional ca rr ie r  as 
well as the largest regional c a rr ie r  on the West c o a s t . O v e r a l l ,  
Horizon was ranked as the 11th largest regional a i r  ca rr ie r  in the 
industry in 1983, transporting 452,925 passengers in that year.^^ In 
1984, Horizon increased the number of passengers enplaned from the 
previous year by 70 percent, carrying 769,625 passengers.^® Horizon was 
ranked as the 7th largest regional c a rr ie r  in the industry in 1984. To 
transport these passengers. Horizon u t i l iz e s  a f le e t  of 20 Fairchild
Metro I l l ' s ,  12 Fairchild  F27's and 1 Fokker F28.
Management
The man behind Horizon A ir  is Milton 6. Kuolt I I .  Kuolt perceived
there was a need fo r improvement and expansion in a i r  carrier service to
the smaller communities in the Pacific  Northwest. According to Kuolt:
" I saw a void in the regional mode of travel 
in the Northwest -  in size of equipment, 
frequency of service to the customer."
With th is thought and no a ir l in e  operating experience, Kuolt established
Horizon. Kuolt believes his lack of operating experience is an asset
rather than a l i a b i l i t y .  In fa c t ,  a l l  of Horizon's non-technical
management came from outside the a i r l in e  industry. The blending of
these non-a irline  management personnel into Horizon's operation created
the balance Kuolt desired.
"We have a large cadre of non-a irline  
management. I wouldn't have i t  any other 
way. I d id n 't  want tra d it io n a l thinking 
in the company."
Route Development
In September of 1981, Horizon commenced operations by serving the 
c i t ie s  of Pasco and Yakima, Washington from Horizon's base in Seattle .
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Today, Horizon's t r a f f i c  market extends from Seattle to Boise, Salt Lake 
City and San Francisco with f l ig h ts  ranging from 26 to 570 miles in 
length, i t s '  average f l ig h t  leg is 150 miles.
In the f i r s t  quarter of 1982, Horizon added the c it ie s  of Portland,
Eugene and Medford, Oregon; Sun Valley , Idaho and Pullman, Washington to 
i ts  route structure. Later that year. Horizon added Spokane, Washington 
and the Idaho c i t ie s  of Boise, Lewiston, Pocatello and Idaho F a lls . In 
June of 1982, Horizon adapted a new strategy by acquiring A ir Oregon, a 
regional a i r l in e  located in Portland, Oregon. This acquisition added 5
Oregon c i t ie s  in addition to those already served by Horizon.
Horizon again expanded in December of 1983 with the acquisition of 
Transwestern A ir lines  of Salt Lake C ity , Utah. As a result of this  
acquisition . Horizon established Boise, Idaho as a major operating hub. 
With the fa i lu re  of Pacific  Express A ir l in e s , Horizon started fly ing  
between San Francisco, C a lifo rn ia  and Klamath F a lls , Oregon under an 
interim  arrangement with Republic A ir l in e s . Republic was charged with 
the responsib ility  o f providing service under the "Essential A ir
Service" program u ntil June 1984. When Republic withdrew its  service in 
June, Horizon was awarded the route and began to serve the market 
d ire c t ly .
In 1984, Horizon added the c it ie s  of Wenatchee, Washington and
Redmond/Bend, Oregon. In 1985, Moses Lake, Washington was added as an 
Essential A ir  Service community bringing the to ta l number of c i t ie s  
served by Horizon to 23 located in 5 states. Hence, the growth and
route development strategies employed by Horizon was a combination of
three fac to rs . F ir s t ,  Horizon commenced service to those locations they
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determined were lacking in a i r  service. Secondly, they expanded th e ir  
operation with the acquisitions of Air Oregon and Transwestern A irlines  
and, f i n a l l y ,  they then cap ita lized  on the markets which were vacated by 
Pacific  Express.
Horizon has experienced rapid growth in the three and one-half
years of i ts  existence and, according to Kuolt, Horizon's strategy is
now to strengthen th e ir  position in the markets they currently serve.
"We're in a mode now of consolidating and 
strengthening our position in the Northwest.
Just to get bigger i sn ' t  the plan. I f  we 
get bigger, i t  w il l  be because we're better."
Route Strategies
As part of Horizon's strategy, the company sought to develop
relationships with major ca rr ie rs . Whereas Chautauqua was created and is 
dedicated to only one major c a r r ie r ,  USAir, Horizon was created and 
developed as an independent a ir l in e  and has relationships with 14 major 
ca rr ie rs .
Horizon in te rlin es  approximately 50 percent of i ts  passengers to 
21major ca rr ie rs . Horizon is able to favorably negotiate jo in t  fares and
terms with the major carriers  because of the high passenger volume
Horizon o ffers  the majors. Horizon's major in te r l in e  partner is United
A ir l in e s . Out of a to ta l of 40,000 jo in t  fare programs divided between
2214 major c a rr ie rs .  Horizon has 12,000 fares with United alone. Horizon
also recognizes the v i ta l  role the major plays in th e ir  success and the
role Horizon plays in the major's success. Accordingly, Horizon w il l
not attempt to compete with a major c a rr ie r .
"We're not planning to aggravate the elephants 
(majors). I t  would be foolhardy to go head- 
to-head with any of the major carriers on the
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density routes. That’ s not our niche. We're 
always try ing to associate-ourselves with good, 
viable (major) a ir l in e s ."
Frequent Service Strategy
Kuolt a ttr ib u tes  much of Horizon's success on the frequent service 
which Horizon provides i ts  customers. Mr. Kuolt feels that frequency 
stimulates t r a f f i c  and therefore. Horizon has followed this course in 
developing and serving markets. Frequent service provides Horizon with 
an advantage when competing against other carriers and i ts  primary 
competition, the automobile. To compete with the automobile. Horizon 
provides i ts  frequent service to small and medium-sized communities 
thereby making i t  as convenient as possible fo r the passenger to f l y  on 
i ts  a i r c r a f t  rather than to drive . This is especially important in 
Horizon's case operating in the western states where the people are 
somewhat more independent in nature and are accustomed to driving longer 
distances than th e ir  counterparts in the east.
"Frequency stimulates t r a f f ic .  The 
automobile, to me, is our major competitor.
I t ' s  not other a ir l in e s .  Wg've got to get 
people out of th e ir  cars."
A irc ra ft  to  Match the Frequency Strategy
Horizon uses a i r c r a f t  consistent with i ts  high frequency strategy. 
Horizon matches equipment to the t r a f f ic  of a particu lar market by 
contro lling  the seating capacity of the a ir c ra f t  which serves these 
markets. Horizon's use of the Fairchild  F-27 and the Metro I I I  allows 
i t  to o f fe r  frequent f l ig h ts  in a cost-e ffec tive  manner. The Horizon 
configured 18 passenger Metro is used on Horizon's thinner routes 
thereby making i t  possible to transport a smaller number of passengers 
without sustaining a financia l loss. On the more dense routes Horizon
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uses the 44 passenger F-27 and the 85 passenger, j e t  powered F-28.
Small Package Express Service
To supplement i ts  passenger revenue. Horizon is involved in
providing a small package express service. Last year, Horizon was
ranked as the 4th largest a i r  cargo c a rr ie r  of a l l  regional a i r
25c a rr ie rs . Although a i r  cargo revenues account for only 5 percent of 
Horizon's revenues. Horizon plans to develop this aspect of the
business.
To accomplish th is .  Horizon has a fu ll - t im e  fre ig h t manager and 
offers same day service of packages within Horizon's route system. In 
addition, Horizon works with fre ig h t forwarders, package carriers and 
has jo in t  fares with some of the major a ir lin es  who handle fre ig h t.  
Currently, Horizon has fre ig h t f a c i l i t i e s  at Boise, Seattle and
Portland.
Chautauqua/Horizon Summary
The strategies employed by Horizon and Chautauqua are d iffe ren t
since the carriers were created fo r  d if fe re n t  purposes and currently  
operate in divergent environments. Horizon was formed as an independent 
c a rr ie r  whereas Chautauqua was created and developed out of an in te r l in e  
re lationship with USAir. Chautauqua's strategy relates d irec tly  to i ts '  
in te r l in e  re lationship  with USAir. Their strategy is to remain in close 
complimentary contact with USAir and be in a position to take advantage 
of the opportunities created and provided by USAir. Horizon's strategy 
must be d if fe re n t  since i t  cannot re ly  on the in te r l in e  relationship to 
provide i t s '  primary source of revenue and guidance. As a re su lt ,  the 
c a rr ie r 's  route structures and strategies are d if fe re n t .
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The strategies used by the regional carriers which in te r l in e  with 
one major c a rr ie r  are to a large degree lim ited or dictated by the major 
c a rr ie r .  I f  the regional c a rr ie r  adds a route which the major carr ie r
does not want the regional to add, the major can put pressure on the
regional to drop the route. Likewise, the major can also require the
regional to add a route which the regional does not wish to add. With
th is  type of re la tionsh ip , the regional is to a large extent dependent 
on the major c a rr ie r  for i ts  growth and well-being.
The independent regional c a rr ie r  l ik e  Horizon, must be able to work
closely with the major carr ie rs  but at the same time be able to develop
strategies independently of these carriers i f  they are to secure success 
in the marketplace. Horizon has and must continue to develop markets 
and revenue sources independent of another c a rr ie r 's  d irect influence.
In both cases, the strategies employed by these carriers are
dependent on the markets which each serves. In the case of the
in te rlin ed  regional c a r r ie r ,  the market is dependent upon the major 
c a rr ie r  and therefore, the regional c a rr ie r 's  thrust should be aimed at  
the fu rther development of th is  relationship with the purpose of 
securing additional complimentary routes. The independent c a rr ie r 's  
strategy must be more independent in nature and be based on i t s '  goals 
re la t iv e  to the market, not the goals of a major c a rr ie r .  The 
strategies of both carr ie rs  must also allow each to adapt and cap ita lize  
on new opportunities which they are afforded.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION -  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The regional a i r l in e  industry has grown at a much faster rate than 
any other segment of the a i r  transportation industry. In 1984, a total 
of 26.1 m illion  passengers were enplaned by regional carriers which 
accounted fo r 4.2 b i l l io n  in revenue passenger miles (RPM). This volume 
increased 19.6 and 29.6 percent respectively from the previous year. As 
w il l  be demonstrated, the growth of the regional a ir l in e  industry has 
outpaced the growth of a l l  U.S. scheduled a ir l in e s  and i t  is anticipated  
this trend w il l  continue in the foreseeable future. This is because je t  
a ir c r a f t  cannot economically compete with the regional ca rr ie r 's  
smaller, more e f f ic ie n t  turboprop a ir c r a f t  in the short-haul, thin  
markets. Therefore, the regional c a rr ie r  can be expected to play an 
increasingly important role in the industry.
A. PASSENGER GROWTH PROJECTIONS
The growth of the domestic a ir l in e  industry can be represented by 
h is torica l and forecasted data revolving around the number of passengers 
enplaned. As indicated in the chart below, the to ta l number of 
passengers enplaned by U.S. domestic carriers increased at an annual 
ra te  of 7 percent from 1970 to 1978. In the post-regulation period from 
1978 to 1984, the annual growth slowed to a 5 percent rate- According 
to projections made by Fairchild  Industries , a manufacturer of commuter 
and m i l i ta ry  a i r c r a f t ,  growth is forecast at an annual rate of 4.5 
percent from 1984 to 1994 fo r the U.S. domestic scheduled a ir l in e  
industry.^ These estimates are consistant with those provided by the FAA 
in th e ir  February, 1985 report to the U.S. government (discussed below).
89
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Based on these forecasts, the U.S. domestic scheduled a ir l in e  t r a f f ic  
w il l  exceed 500 m illio n  passengers by 1994.
U.S. DOMESTIC SCHEDULED AIRLINE TRAFFIC 1970 -  1994^
Number of Passengers (M illions)
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In terms of the number of passengers enplaned, the regional a ir l in e
sector of the a i r  transportation industry has grown at an annual rate of
12 percent per year from 1970 to 1978. However, in the deregulated
years from 1978 through 1984, the regional a i r l in e  industry has grown at
a rate of 17 percent per year. I t  is estimated that the regional
a ir l in e  industry wi l l  grow at an average of 10 percent from the period
•5
1984 through 1994. The following graph i l lu s tra te s  this growth.
U.S. REGIONAL AIRLINE TRAFFIC 1970 -  1994 
Number of Passengers (M illions)
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As indicated in the f i r s t  graph, there were approximately 330 
m illio n  passengers enplaned by the domestic scheduled a ir l in e  system in 
1984. Of this number, approximately 26 m illion  or 8 percent were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
carried by the regional a i r l in e s .  By 1994, Fairchild predicts the total 
number of passengers transported by the domestic scheduled a ir l in e  
industry w il l  exceed 500 m il l io n .^  Of th is ,  the regional a ir l in e  
industry is expected to transport 70 m illio n  by 1994 representing 14 
percent of the to ta l transported.^ Using 1970 as a base index, a 
graphic i l lu s tra t io n  can be made comparing the growth curve of the 
regional carriers  to the a i r l in e  industry as a whole. I t  is apparent 
that the regional a i r l in e  industry is becoming a more s ign ificant force. 
This is represented by the increasing percentage of passengers that the 
regional carrie rs  are transporting each year re la t iv e  to the overall a i r  
t r a f f i c .
TRAFFIC INDEX 
PASSENGER GROWTH CURVES 1970 -  1994
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YEAR
In a February 1985 presentation to the U.S. government, the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) predicted that aviation a c t iv ity  would
g
grow a t a fas te r rate than the general economy through 1996. The FAA 
fu rther stated that the regional a i r l in e  industry would out pace the 
growth of the U.S. domestic a ir l in e  industry during this period. The 
FAA's forecast included the following elements;
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1. The revenue passenger miles w il l  increase at an 
annual ra te  of 4 .9  percent for a l l  domestic a i r  
ca rr ie rs .
2. A irc ra f t  operations w i l l  increase at a rate of 2 
percent per year which w il l  re f le c t  higher load 
fac tors , increased seating capacity and longer 
stage lengths.
3. The regional a i r l in e  industry would enplane 23.7 
m illio n  passengers in 1984 (the actual number was
26.1 m il l io n )  which would account for approximately 
6.6 percent of a l l  passengers enplaned on the 
scheduled c a rr ie rs . By 1996, the regional 
carriers  were projected to carry 54.2 m illion  
passengers and account fo r 9.3 percent of a ll  
transported passengers.
In comparing the two forecasts (FAA versus Fairchild Industries), 
the numbers in terms of projected passengers enplaned d if fe r  but the 
trends of the forecasts p ara lle l one another. Both forecasts project 
that the regional a i r l in e  industry is expected to grow faster than any 
other segment of the a i r  transportation industry.
Although the regional carr ie rs  transport a re la t iv e ly  small 
percentage of the to ta l passengers enplaned, i t  is s ign ificant to note 
that the trend from 1970 to 1984 has been increasing each year. Equally 
noteworthy is the fa c t that th is trend is expected to continue during 
the next 10 years. Thus, i t  is reasonable to assume that the regional 
c a rr ie r  w i l l  be considered a s ig n if ican t force in the industry in the 
foreseeable future.
Stage Length
As previously discussed, the regional a ir l in e s  generally operate in 
stage lengths of between 100 and 300 miles although in the case of 
Horizon A ir l in e s ,  Horizon's stage length ranged from 26 to 570 miles. 
Hence, the stage length which the regional carriers  are able to operate
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vary s ig n if ic a n t ly .  In evaluating the stage lengths of a l l  domestic 
c a rr ie rs , the segments can be broken down to 7 categories. A large 
percentage of segments are in the less than 150 statute mile range 
category.
In 1984, there were approximately 2,200 segments operated by 
c e r t i f ie d  a ir  carr ie rs  in the domestic U.S. with the majority 
d is tr ibu tion  of 25 percent in the less than 150 mile category. The 
second most popular f l ig h t  range segment was the 151 to 250 mile 
category. This category represented approximately 400 segments or 18 
percent. The fourth most popular range category was the 251 to 350 mile 
category. Hence, of the 7 categories, the regional carrier can easily  
operate in three of the 4 most popular ranges.
500-
450
400-
350-
300-
250-
200
150-
100
50-
0
NUMBER OF SEGMENTS BY RANGE CATEGORY' 
1984 U.S. DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
0-150 151-250 251-350 351-450 451-550 551-850 851 +
Mile Segments
Fuel Prices
The outlook for the regional a i r l in e  industry in terms of passenger 
t r a f f ic  is expected to s ig n if ic a n t ly  out pace the a ir l in e  industry as a 
whole. However, the current moderation of fuel prices is encouraging 
larger a ir l in e s  to re -enter some of th e ir  previously abandoned markets. 
This is viewed as a temporary condition due to the fac t that the world
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supply of petroleum is f in i t e  and demand from a l l  sectors of society 
tends to grow. As fuel prices r is e ,  the larger carriers wi l l  be forced 
to abandon or reduce service in many of these short-haul markets. The 
regional c a rr ie r  w il l  then pick up the void l e f t  by the larger ca rr ie r .
In addition, the new generation equipment being introduced in 
regional a i r l in e  service w i l l  separate the operating economics between 
the regional c a rr ie r  and the larger c a rr ie r  operating je t  a irc ra f t  even 
fu rther. These a i r c r a f t  were developed during a period of energy 
conservation ( la te  1970's and early  1980's) and they were designed to be 
fuel e f f ic ie n t .  In the long run, the c a rr ie r  operating je t  a irc ra f t  
w il l  not be able to compete in the low density markets against the 
regional c a rr ie r  operating the fuel e f f ic ie n t  turboprop a irc ra f t .
B. AIRCRAFT
The average size of the a ir c r a f t  being operated by regional 
carr ie rs  has been growing steadily  since 1978. As the regional carriers  
have expanded th e ir  markets, they have acquired larger equipment to meet 
the needs of these growing markets. In 1978, the average seating 
capacity of the 1047 a ir c r a f t  which served the regional a ir l in e  industry 
was 11.9 seats. In 1984, the average seating capacity was 18.4 seats 
per a i r c r a f t .
The m ajority of the regional carriers  can be expected to continue 
operating the 15 to 50 passenger a i r c r a f t .  Seven turboprop a irc ra f t  in 
th is category account fo r  55 percent of the to ta l seating capacity in 
the industry. These a i r c r a f t  are the Fairchild  Metro (19 passengers), 
deHavilland Twin O tter (19 passengers), Embraer Bandeirante (19 
passengers). Short Brothers SD 330 and the SD 360 (30 and 36 passengers
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resp ec tive ly ), Fokker/Fairchild F-27 (44-50 passengers) and the
deHavilland Dash 7 (50 passengers).
In a previous section, i t  was noted that in 1983 the number of 
turboprop a i r c r a f t  exceeded the piston-powered a irc ra f t .  The trend 
towards the more e f f ic ie n t  turboprop a ir c ra f t  can also be expected to 
continue. This is due to the fuel e f f ic ie n t  nature of the turboprop 
a ir c ra f t  and the significance of fuel costs to the regional operator. 
In addition, the new-generation a ir c ra f t  being introduced are a l l  
turboprop a i r c r a f t  and these a i r c r a f t  can be expected to o ffe r  
substantial improvements in both per-horsepower performance and fuel 
consumption. I t  is not unreasonable to expect the new generation 
a ir c ra f t  w i l l  be as much as 50 percent more economical on a per seat 
basis than some of the a i r c r a f t  in regional service today. Therefore, 
on a per seat basis the la rg e r, new-generation a irc ra f t  lend additional 
support to the trend forecasted favoring the larger a irc ra f t .
According to Alan R. Stephen, the Regional A ir l in e  Association's 
vice president, the average seating capacity w il l  grow to the mid-30
Q
seat range over the next f iv e  years. Two reasons are sited for the 
trend to the larger a i r c r a f t .  F i r s t ,  regional a ir lin es  are becoming of 
age and as such, they are reaching a point of fu l ly  developing the 
markets they currently  serve. The regional a ir l in e s  are also learning 
to adapt to the conditions of the marketplace. The carriers are now 
able to optimize the use of th e ir  a i r c r a f t  by matching equipment to the 
demands of the market. Secondly, the majority of the new generation 
a i r c r a f t  being introduced are in the 30 seat and above category. As of 
year end 1983, six manufacturers (Saab-Fairchild , deHavilland, Short
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
96
Brothers, Ernbracr, CASA and Aerospatiale) had introduced new generation 
a ir c r a f t  in the 30 or more seat category. These manufacturers have 
announced orders and options fo r  approximately 600 a irc ra f t  worldwide.
The outlook fo r a i r c r a f t  deliveries support the notion of continued 
growth in the regional a i r l in e  industry and in the regional ca rr ie r 's  
movement towards larger equipment. The 10 to 19 passenger seat a irc ra f t  
has dominated the regional a i r l in e  industry since 1978 and this seat 
category is expected to continue to dominate the industry until 1986. 
According to the projections of Samuel C. Colwell, a former market 
analyst of Fairchild  Industries, another seat capacity category, the 20 
to 39 seat category, can be expected to dominate the purchases of the 
regional carriers  from 1986 to 1994. During this period, the 10 to 19 
passenger seat a i r c r a f t  w i l l  steadily  decrease in popularity and by 
1991, Colwell projected that the 40 passenger seat a irc ra f t  w il l  replace 
the 10 to 19 passenger a ir c r a f t  as the second most popular category of 
new purchase a i r c r a f t  behind the 20 to 39 seat a irc ra f t .
C. REGIONAL AIRLINE CARRIERS
In 1984, the top 50 regional carrie rs  dominated the industry in 
terms of to ta l passengers enplanement and as a group, these carriers  
increased th e ir  share of the market. The top 50 carriers transported 
21.9 m illio n  passengers of the 26.1 m illio n  to ta l passengers enplaned in 
1984, representing a very s ig n if ica n t 84 percent. This figure was up 
from 1983 wherein the top 50 carr ie rs  transported 17.7 m illion  
passengers which accounted for approximately 81 percent of the enplaned 
passengers. In terms of revenue passenger miles, the top 50 regional 
carr ie rs  accounted fo r 3.5 b i l l io n  or about 84 percent of the industry's
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to ta l fo r  1984 compared to 3.2 or 81 percent in 1983.
The 10 largest regional carrie rs  generally grew at a faster rate 
than the industry's average in 1984. The passengers these carriers  
enplaned increased a t an average of 29 percent versus the industry's 
average of 19.6 percent. The top 10 carriers accounted fo r 38 percent
of the industry’ s passenger enplanements in 1984, up from 35 percent in
1983. Five of these carr ie rs : Mid Pacific A ir l in e s , Provincetown-Boston 
A ir l in e s , B r i t t  Airways, A ir Wisconsin and Empire A ir lin e s , exceeded one 
m illion  passengers enplaned in 1984. In 1983 only one c a rr ie r .  Mid 
Pacific A ir l in e s , exceeded th is  mark.
The dominance of the top 100 carriers can be expected to continue. 
The number of regional a i r  carr ie rs  can be expected to decrease steadily  
each year and w il l  s ta b il iz e  at about 100 carriers in the 1990's 
according to forecasts made by Colwell. This is the result of the 
continued dominance of the top 100 carriers  and the current trend in the 
regional industry to merge and/or acquire other regional carrie rs . As 
previously stated, las t  year's  top 100 carriers accounted fo r  
approximately 96 percent of a l l  passenger enplaned by the regional
a i r l in e s .
Mergers and acquisitions can be expected to continue as the 
carriers  seek to a lign  themselves with a complimentary company. In
1985, two of the top 10 regional ca rr ie rs . A ir Wisconsin and Mississippi 
Valley A ir lin e s  announced a consolidation. In January, Pilgrim A irlines  
and NewAir announced th e ir  merger. Also in January, the merger between 
A ir  Midwest and Scheduled Skyways was consummated. Air Midwest was
ranked as the 16th largest regional c a rr ie r  in 1983 and Scheduled
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Skyways was ranked 32nd. Combined, these companies were ranked as the 
10th largest regional c a rr ie r  in 1984. Additional mergers include 
Skywest A ir l ines  acquisition of SunAire Lines, Provincetown-Boston 
A irlines acquisition of Marco Island Airways, Horizon's acquisition of 
A ir Oregon and Transwestern A ir l in e s ,  and A ir V irg in ia 's  acquisition of 
Mid South A ir l in e s .
In addition to the acquisitions and mergers of regional carr ie rs ,  
there are accelerating alliances between regional and major carriers .  
These relationships vary in structure and in responsibilities to one 
another but are becoming more s ign ificant to the regional carr ie r in 
terms of passenger load factors and survival. This topic w il l  be 
discussed in the next section.
D. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
Based on research and discussions with leaders of the industry,
there appears to be four areas which may s ig n if ican tly  e ffec t the
regional a i r l in e  industry. Not a l l  represent problems to the carriers  
and in fa c t ,  some may work to the benefit of the regional c a rr ie r .
These four areas are:
1. In te r l in e  Relationships with Major Carriers
2. Financial Arrangements
3. Two-Letter Designator
4. Computer Reservation System
In te r l in e  Arrangements with Major Carriers
As stated above, the relationships between the regional and major 
carriers are becoming more widespread and the number of formal
associations can be expected to increase in the foreseeable future. The 
reasons fo r the popularity of the in te r l in e  relationship and i ts
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advantages were discussed in Section I I I .  The popularity is reflected  
in the number of in te r l in e  relationships accomplished recently.
However, there is a negative side to the in te r l in e  relationship  
which can be found in the level of control the major carr ie r  can have on 
the regional c a rr ie r .  For example, in the Allegheny Commuter system, 
the commuters must have USAir's approval prior to in i t ia t in g  service 
into a new market. Hence, the Allegheny Commuters cannot expand without 
f i r s t  clearing i t  with USAir. Further, i f  the major carr ie r determines 
the markets served by th e ir  a f f i l i a t e  regional ca rr ie r  do not ju s t i fy  
service, the major c a rr ie r  can realign the regional carriers route 
structure. In most cases, the regional c a rr ie r  would probably agree 
with the decision and would in a l l  likelihood have an opportunity to 
discuss the change with the major c a rr ie r  p rior to withdrawing its  
service from a market. Nonetheless, i t  i l lu s tra te s  the amount of 
control and influence the major c a rr ie r  can have on the regional 
c a rr ie r .  The regional c a rr ie r  would be well advised to review the 
potential problems which i t  may encounter prior to entering into an 
in te r l in e  re lationship  with a major c a rr ie r .
In choosing an in te r l in e  partner, the regional carr ie r  must 
exercise caution. I t  may be advantageous fo r the regional carr ie r  to 
choose a major c a r r ie r  which serves a number of hub airports already 
being served by the regional. This would involve a minimum of risk and 
adjustment to both c a rr ie rs . The most desirable partner to the regional 
c a rr ie r  would be an aggressive, f in a n c ia l ly  stable major c a rr ie r  which 
also has a history of good labor re la tio n s . I f  the major c a rr ie r  takes 
a s t r ik e ,  the in te r l in e d  regional c a rr ie r  w il l  also be affected. In the
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event o f a s t r ik e ,  the regional c a rr ie r  may find that i t  does not have 
enough t r a f f i c  to support i ts  operation. Even the re la t iv e ly
independent Horizon A ir  connects 50 percent of i ts  passengers to a major 
c a rr ie r .  Chautauqua A ir lines  on the other hand connects 95 percent of 
i ts  passengers to other c a rr ie rs .  Hence, in most cases, the regional 
c a rr ie r  w i l l  be s ig n if ic a n t ly  effected by a s tr ik e .
The financia l strength of the major ca rr ie r  is equally important. 
I f  the major c a rr ie r  encounters financial d if f ic u l t ie s  to the point of 
having to withdraw service from some of the markets which the regional 
c a rr ie r  is providing feed t r a f f i c ,  the regional carr ie r  may suffer. I f
the major c a rr ie r  completely ceases operations, the regional carr ie r may
experience a dramatic drop in t r a f f i c  due to the loss of the "feed" 
t r a f f i c .  Hence, the regional c a rr ie r  may be l e f t  with id le equipment. 
Financial Arrangements
The arrangements made with various financial institu tions has and 
w il l  continue to be of concern to the regional c a rr ie r .  As previously 
discussed, the a i r l in e  industry is extremely capital intensive. 
Currently, regional carrie rs  are acquiring a ir c ra f t  which may cost in 
excess of $6.0 m illio n  each. In order to secure funds for the 
acquisition of these a i r c r a f t  and other equipment, the managers of these 
a ir l in e s  must become fa m il ia r  with and be able to apply and present 
formal finance packages to the lending ins titu tio ns  from which they are 
seeking funds. The regional a i r l in e  industry is becoming more complex 
and f in a n c ia l ly  sophisticated and therefore, the carriers must be 
capable o f relaying necessary and pertinent financial data to the
financ ia l community in a lucid and persuasive fashion.
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The regional c a rr ie r  can prepare i t s e l f  by being able to supply 
audited financia l statements, proforma financial statements, cash flow 
analysis and projections. Additional information which would be of 
benefit to the lending in s titu t io n s  would include background information 
on the company and i ts  o f f ic e rs ,  a l i s t  of the short and long-term goals 
of the company, a summary of the proposed purchase outlining the 
benefits to the c a rr ie r  and the growth prospects for the region to be 
served. This information can be of great assistance to the carr ie r  for  
i ts  own internal use as well as in securing funds. As part of an on­
going program, the c a rr ie r  should also s tr ive  to keep in touch with the 
f inancia l community. This w i l l  ce rta in ly  create goodwill and provide
the lender an additional level of comfort in dealing with the carr ie r .  
Two-Letter Designator
The tw o -le tte r  designator is synonymous with the in te rlin e  
agreement between the major and regional c a rr ie r .  As discussed, the 
in te rlin ed  regional c a rr ie r  adopts the tw o-le tte r  designator of i ts  
major partner. In doing so, oftentimes the passengers do not rea lize  
the f l ig h t  w il l  be on-board the regional c a rr ie r 's  smaller a irc ra f t .  
Herein l ie s  the problem. The major c a rr ie r 's  designator may confuse the 
travel agent or passenger into thinking he/she is purchasing a t ic k e t  to 
board the major's large j e t  a i r c r a f t .
The regional carr ie rs  are divided on th is issue. The carriers  
which have in te r l in e  relationships generally support the tw o-le tte r
designator issue fo r the reasons discussed in Section I I I .  Those
carr ie rs  not involved in an in te r l in e  relationship are generally 
opposed. Currently , there is discussion in the industry to compromise
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
on th is  issue. The compromise would allow the regional carriers to 
u t i l i z e  the tw o -le tte r  designator provided that the designator is 
followed by another le t t e r  (o r  two) to distinguish i t  from the major 
c a rr ie r .  The proposed compromise has general acceptance in the industry 
and therefore i ts  adoption may be expected.
Computer Reservation System
Like the tw o -le tte r  designator, the computer reservation system 
(CRS) favors those regional carr ie rs  which are interlined  with a major 
c a rr ie r  which owns and operates a CRS. Currently, the CRS rule allows 
the carrie rs  which own and operate CRSs to establish fees for the use 
and penalties fo r non-on l in e  connections.
The carriers  which do not own or which are not associated with a 
c a rr ie r  which owns a CRS, are a t a competitive disadvantage for two 
reasons. F irs t ,  the CRS owners are able to l i s t  th e ir  f l ig h ts  and th e ir  
associated regional c a r r ie r 's  f l ig h ts  ahead of other carriers in the 
computer reservation system. When a passenger requests f l ig h t  
information, the travel agent's information network w il l  display the CRS 
owner's f l ig h ts  ahead of the other ca rr ie rs . Thus, there is a greater 
likelihood the passenger w il l  choose the CRS owner's f l ig h t  ahead of a 
non-owner c a r r ie r ,  a l l  things being equal. Secondly, the rule allows 
the owners to establish fees fo r the use of the system. In e ffe c t ,  the 
market is controlled by 5 major ca rr ie rs .
The non-owners do have an a lte rn a t iv e .  They can develop th e ir  own 
Computer Reservation System. I f  th is were an easy solution, the non- 
owner ca rr ie rs  would surely adopt i t .  Unfortunately, the cost to 
develop such a system and get i t  operational severely lim its  this
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a lte rn a t iv e .  In the near fu tu re , the CRS system can be expected to 
remain biased and expensive. However, industry leaders anticipate a 
more uniform and f a i r  method of handling this problem w ill  be developed 
within the coming year.
E. SUMMARY
The regional a i r l in e  industry was recognized in 1969 as a d is tinc t  
class of a i r  c a r r ie r .  Since that time, the number of passengers
enplaned has grown stead ily  and the indications are that this trend w ill  
continue into the foreseeable fu ture . Although the number of carriers  
serving the industry can be expected to level o ff  around the 100 carrier  
mark, the surviving carr ie rs  w il l  prosper and absorb the additional 
passenger loads l e f t  from the carriers which cease operations. These 
surviving carriers  are expected to have several common t ra i ts .
F ir s t ,  these regional carrie rs  w il l  have a strong financial base 
and a financia l management approach to business. This orientation is 
essential due to the capital intensive nature of the industry.
Secondly, the carrie rs  w il l  operate fuel e f f ic ie n t  a irc ra f t  and have a 
well established maintenance program. Fuel and maintenance costs 
account fo r  40 percent of the carriers d irec t operating costs and 
therefore represent a s ig n if ican t cost to the regional a i r l in e .  The 
c a rr ie r  can best control these costs by acquiring fuel e f f ic ie n t  
a ir c ra f t  and c a re fu lly  managing the maintenance performed on these 
a i r c r a f t .  Th ird ly , the regional carrie rs  w il l  acquire a irc ra f t  with 
more seating capacity. The number of passenger seats per a irc ra f t  has 
stead ily  grown and as the regional c a rr ie r  develops its  markets, a 
corresponding need fo r larger a i r c r a f t  w il l  arise . The regional
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carr ie rs  are operating more e f f ic ie n t ly  within th e ir  markets as 
evidenced by the increasing seating capacity and increasing the number 
of hours the regional c a r r ie r 's  a i r c ra f t  are f ly in g . Combined, these 
factors indicate that the regional c a rr ie r  w il l  continue to move towards 
the larger a i r c r a f t .
Another t r a i t  among the successful carriers which w ill  be found is 
the recognition by the regional ca rr ie r  of i ts  "niche". Clearly, the 
successful regional c a rr ie r  must know where i t  is going and must 
understand the markets which i t  serves. Without th is ,  the regional 
c a rr ie r  w i l l  not be able to e ffe c t iv e ly  manage the a ffa irs  of the
operation or d ire c t i ts  fu ture . F in a lly ,  the successful regional 
c a rr ie r  can be expected to have a relationship with one or more of the 
major ca rr ie rs . This re lationship  can range from an informal
arrangement to a formal in te r l in e  agreement in which the major carrier  
is able to control the d irection of the regional a i r l in e .  This last  
item can p o te n tia lly  be the most influencing factor effecting the future 
of the regional a i r l in e  industry. Depending upon the in te rlin e
agreement, the major c a rr ie r  can dominate and control the a c t iv it ie s  of 
the regional c a r r ie r .  I f  the major c a rr ie r  is allowed to do so, the 
regional c a rr ie r  would in e f fe c t ,  become dependent upon the major 
c a rr ie r .  Therefore, the in te r l in e  agreement must be carefully
negotiated and considered by the regional c a rr ie r  prior to entering into
th is  arrangement.
O vera ll,  these findings indicate that with respect to the future of 
the regional a i r l in e  industry one can be very optim istic . During the 
next 10 years, the industry w i l l  prosper as well as those individuals
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who are able to recognize the opportunities within the industry.
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EXHIBIT A
TOP 50 REGIONAL AIRLINES IN 1984 
(PASSENGERS ENPLANED)
1984 1984RM INN 
1
2
Mid Pacific  A ir l in es  
PSA
PASSENGERS
1,338,284
1,331,4913 B r i t t  Airways 1,204,8854 Air Wisconsin 1,095,0005 Empire A ir lines 1,073,4526 Metro A irlines 844,8397 Horizon A irlines 769.625
8 Mississippi Valley A ir lines 741,279
9 Henson A irlines 733,536
10 A ir Midwest 710,782
11 Skywest/Sun Aire Lines 652,698
12 A tlan tic  Southeast A irlines 613,900
13 PRINAIR 576,795
14 Ransome A irl ines 566,754
15 Rocky Mountain Airways 481,619
16 Pennslyvania A ir l in e 464,462
17 Aspen Airways 443,958
18 Comai r 417,601
19 Rio Airways 408,798
20 Royale A ir lines 400,361
21 Cascade Airways 389,279
22 Simmons A irlines 376,134
23 Wings West A irlines 360,075
24 Suburban A irlines 346,226
25 Wright A ir lines 307,998
26 Imperial A irlines 303,323
27 Pilgrim A irlines 301.406
28 Bar Harbor A ir lines 297,875
29 Name withheld by Request 285,000
30 Midstate A ir lines 277,413
31 Brockway A ir 276,322
32 Chautauqua A irl ines 267,091
33 Command Airways 258,585
34 A ir  V irg in ia 248,102
35 Gull A ir 223,294
36 Frontier Commuter 220,000
37 Crown Airways 211,813
38 Royal Hawaiian A ir  Service 202,451
39 Fisher Brothers Aviation 192,635
40 Pocono A ir lin es 191,938
41 Crownair/Dorado Wings 175,000
42 American Central A ir l ines 174,386
43 Chaparral A ir l ines 164,834
44 Southern Jersey Airways 161,411
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1984 1984
BANK CARRIER PASSENGERS
45 SEAIR Alaska A ir lin es  146,000
46 NewAir 142,696
47 Precision A ir lines  140,657
48 Pacific  Coast A ir l ines  140,063
49 ERA Helicopters (Alaska A ir lines  Subcontractor) 140,000
50 San Juan A ir lin e s  121,406
TOTAL ENPLANEMENTS TOP 50 AIRLINES 21,916,000 84%
TOTAL ENPLANEMENTS ALL OTHER AIRLINES 4,224,000 16%
TOTAL INDUSTRY ENPLANEMENTS 26,140,000
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EXHIBIT B
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT BY SEAT CAPACITY 
1978 TO 1984
Number of 
A irc ra f t
1000.
900-
800
700
600-
500-
400-
300-
200 -
100
0 . jr jr C ilH
Less than 
10 Seats
10 -  19 
Seats
20 -  30 
Seats
31 -  50 
Seats
Over 50 
Seats
LEGEND (From Left to Right):
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
SOURCE: REGIONAL AIRLINE ASSOCIATION
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EXHIBIT C
REGIONAL AIRLINER COST 
FOR 150 NAUTICAL MILE STAGE LENGTH
COST PER A.S.M. 
( 4/A.S.M. )
25.0.
2 0 . 0 -
15.0-
•11.5
10 . 0 -
13^
9.7
COST PER PLANE MILE 
{ $/Plane Mile )
11.0
2.46
2.04
3.79
2.96
-  6.00
5.48 -
-  5.0
- 4.0
-  3.00
-  2.00
5.0-
-  1.00
0 . 0 -
15-19 20-40 40-50 15-19 20-40 40-50
Seats Seats Seats Seats Seats Seats
SOURCE: AVIATION CONSULTING, INC.
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EXHIBIT D
REGIONAL AIRLINER COST 
FOR 150 NAUTICAL MILE STAGE LENGTH
COST PER A.S.M. 
( f/A .S.M . )
25 .0-
20 .0-
15.0-
-11.5
10 . 0 -
COST PER PLANE MILE 
( $/Plane Mile )
5.4(
12.5
11.0
-  6.00
.37
2.79 
2 . 4 6 ^ ^  2.96
2704
- 5.00 
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-  1.00
0 . 0 -
15-19 20-40 40-50 15-19 20-40 40-50
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LEGEND:
fuel at $1 .0 0 /gal FUEL AT $1 .50/GAL
\\̂ %
SOURCE: AVIATION CONSULTING, INC.
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EXHIBIT E 
RESALE VALUES OF REGIONAL AIRCRAFT
1 4 0 -
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120 -
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SOURCE: FOKKER AIRCRAFT U .S .A ., INC.
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